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INTRODUCTION 
The voting rights of common stockholders have been gerrymandered 
through the use of dual-class and multiclass governance structures, which 
drive a wedge between the economic interests and voting entitlements of 
shareholders. These corporate governance structures are designed to preserve 
control for corporate insiders, including founders and family members. 
Insiders can secure majority voting power in corporate affairs without 
needing to retain a proportionate economic interest in the enterprise. The 
corollary is that ordinary shareholders are not afforded a commensurate 
amount of voting rights with their economic interest. Main Street investors 
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have a diminished voice, and their ability to influence the decisionmaking of 
firms is diluted. Although dual-class structures date back nearly a century, 
this practice has been on the rise in American corporations—especially 
following Google’s debut as a public company. 
Google, Inc., a leading multinational technology firm now known as 
Alphabet, Inc., established a dual-class ownership structure comprised of two 
classes of common stock with different voting entitlements as part of its 
initial public offering (IPO) in 2004.2 Class A common stock was issued to 
the public and “entitled to one vote per share” whereas Class B common stock 
was reserved for insiders including “founders, executive officers, directors . . . 
and employees” and “entitled to ten votes per share.”3 As the company 
explained in a preamble to its prospectus entitled “Letter from the Founders: 
‘An Owner’s Manual’ for Google’s Shareholders,” 
Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one . . . . 
[T]he standard [“one share, one vote”] structure of public ownership may 
jeopardize [our] independence . . . . Therefore, we have designed a corporate 
[dual-class] structure that will protect Google’s ability to innovate and retain 
its most distinctive characteristics . . . . By investing in Google, you are 
placing an unusual long-term bet on the team . . . . In the transition to public 
ownership, we have set up a corporate structure that will make it harder for 
outside parties to take over or influence Google.4 
Thus, Google’s cofounders made it patently clear to potential investors 
that its dual-class voting structure would make it difficult for external parties 
to interfere with or exercise control over its insiders, who would retain 
disproportionate voting power relative to their economic interest. 
Just eight years following its IPO, Google announced a recapitalization 
plan to install a novel tripartite class ownership structure.5 Google sought to 
effectuate a two-for-one stock split by creating Class C nonvoting capital 
stock and distributing one Class C share for each and every Class A and Class 
B share outstanding.6 Google’s cofounders explained that they wished to 
maintain their “founder-led approach” and to continue shielding Google 
 
2 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at iii (Apr. 29, 2004) (stipulating that Class A 
and Class B shares of common stock “have identical economic rights and differ only as to voting rights”). 
3 Id. at *21, 85 n.1. Common shares with relatively greater voting entitlements are colloquially 
referred to as “high-vote stock.” 
4 Id. at i, iii. 
5 See Google Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 2 (Apr. 12, 2012) (disclosing that Google’s 
“Board of Directors . . . unanimously approved a proposal . . . to amend [its] certificate of 
incorporation to create a new class of capital stock, subject to stockholder approval”). 
6 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2011 Founder’s Letter, ALPHABET (Apr. 12, 2012), https://abc.xyz/
investor/founders-letters/2011 [https://perma.cc/8BL5-ZANJ] (announcing Google’s plan “to create a 
new class of non-voting capital stock” which would be “distributed via a stock dividend”). 
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“from outside pressures.”7 Although the voting power of insiders would remain 
unchanged immediately following the recapitalization, this proposed transaction 
would enable insiders to retain substantial voting control over time, as the 
company would use Class C nonvoting shares for “routine equity-based employee 
compensation” and “stock-based acquisitions” going forward.8 In other words, 
this new tripartite class structure would preserve voting influence among insiders 
“for decades to come.”9 Google shareholders promptly brought suit seeking to 
enjoin the recapitalization effort by alleging breach of fiduciary duties and 
arguing that the stock split was in reality a “thinly veiled attempt to entrench [the 
founders by] preserv[ing] their voting power into perpetuity.”10 The parties 
eventually reached a settlement pretrial, and the substantive issues in this matter 
were never litigated.11 The recapitalization was finally consummated in 2014, 
cementing Alphabet’s current tripartite class ownership structure.12 
Dual-class and multiclass stock governance structures13 are employed to 
secure control for insiders who would otherwise lack majority control of the 
corporation based on their economic interest alone.14 These voting structures 
are considered to be “the most extreme example of antitakeover protection” 
since “these companies are virtually immune to a hostile takeover.”15 The use 
of dual-class common stock regimes by Alphabet, Facebook,16 Snap,17 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Verified Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Brockton Ret. Bd. v. Page, No. 7469, 2012 WL 
1497439 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2012). 
11 See Order and Final Judgment at 4, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 
2013 WL 5949928 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2013) (“[T]his Court hereby fully and finally approves the 
Settlement . . . .”); see also Google Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2013) (indicating that 
“the Delaware Court of Chancery approved the settlement” of the civil litigation). 
12 See, e.g., Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 8 (Apr. 24, 2014) (“In January 2014, 
our board of directors approved a distribution of shares of the Class C capital stock as a dividend to 
our holders of Class A and Class B common stock . . . .”) 
13 Hereafter in this Comment, I use the phrase “dual-class” to encompass any dual-class and 
multiclass stock arrangement that legally separates cash-flow rights from voting rights. 
14 When a dual-class structure has ten-to-one voting entitlements reserved for high-vote stock, 
it can be mathematically shown that a holder of such shares only requires less than ten percent 
economic ownership to maintain majority voting control. Consider a firm with one million shares 
of common stock, consisting of 90,910 high-vote shares and 909,090 low-vote shares. Each share has 
the same cash flow rights, but high-vote stock is entitled to ten votes per share and low-vote stock 
is entitled to one vote per share. The 90,910 high-vote shares are entitled to 909,100 votes whereas 
the 909,090 low-vote shares are entitled to 909,090 votes. The high-vote shares, representing just 
9.1% of the total number of shares, would secure voting control. Table 1 in the Appendix presents 
these numbers and percentages. 
15 Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-
Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010). 
16 See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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Spotify,18 Lyft,19 and other prominent technology firms has thrust the issue of 
disproportionate voting structures into the spotlight and has raised pressing 
questions about whether this is a desirable or problematic development. 
Issues posed by nonvoting stock have been raised and explored for nearly a 
century now.20 Interrelated topics of dual-class shares and nonvoting shares have 
gained renewed interest in academic circles,21 law firm client memos,22 business 
news outlets,23 and the investing community at large.24 A trade organization 
 
18 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., Milton M. Bergerman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock, 37 YALE L.J. 445, 445 
(1928) (“The practice of depriving stockholders of the right to participate in the management of 
large corporations by means of . . . non-voting stock has become so widespread that the legal status 
of these methods of disenfranchising shareholders assumes a new importance.”); A. A. Berle, Jr., 
Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control”, 39 HARV. L. REV. 673, 677 (1926) (“[T]he problem of 
‘bankers’ control’ ordinarily arises only where there is a capital structure including a class of non-
voting stock actually . . . non-preferential in character, simultaneously with another class of stock 
vested with voting power.”). 
21 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 
103 VA. L. REV. 585, 589-90 (2017) (exploring the benefits and costs of dual-class structures from a 
temporal perspective and finding that potential costs exceed potential advantages with the passage 
of time following an IPO). 
22 See, e.g., James Moloney, Sean Sullivan & Alon Sachar, Non-Voting Shares and Judicial 
Scrutiny, 31 INSIGHTS, May 2017, at 10-13 (questioning what standard of review the Delaware courts 
would apply to actions taken by Snap’s board of directors in light of its exclusive use of nonvoting 
public shares); Steven M. Haas & Charles L. Brewer, Nonvoting Common Stock: A Legal Overview, 
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP (Nov. 2017), https://www.hunton.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34138/
nonvoting-common-stock.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6DU-BQ22] (intending to “provide an overview 
of the legal issues associated with nonvoting common stock of Delaware corporations”). 
23 See, e.g., Benjamin Robertson & Andrea Tan, Why Facebook to Snap Make Investors Feel Second-Class: 
QuickTake, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-facebook-to-snap-
make-investors-feel-second-class-quicktake/2018/01/21/21bba666-ff0f-11e7-86b9-8908743c79dd_story.html  
(“Supporters say dual-class shares enable executives to focus on the long term and resist expectations by major 
investors that each quarter’s earnings will be better than the previous one’s. . . . Detractors say dual-class shares 
subvert the traditional system that’s designed to give equal treatment to all shareholders.”); Andrea Tan & 
Benjamin Robertson, Why Investors Are Fretting over Dual-Class Shares, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/why-investors-are-fretting-over-dual-class-shares-
quicktake-q-a  (discussing potential merits and contemporary issues with dual-class common stock structures). 
24 See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN ASSET MANAGEMENT, GLOBAL PROXY VOTING PROCEDURES AND 
GUIDELINES: NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH 
AMERICA, AND ASIA 67 (2017), https://am.jpmorgan.com/blob-gim/1383433248923/83456/2017_
Global%20Procedures%20and%20Guidelines_FINAL.pdf?segment=AMERICAS_US_RET&locale=
en_US [https://perma.cc/NVW8-96TW] (“JPMAM believes in the fundamental principle of ‘one 
share, one vote.’ . . . We are opposed to all mechanisms that skew voting rights . . . . Directors should 
represent all shareholders equally and voting power should accrue in direct proportion to a shareholder’s 
economic interest . . . .”); Patrick Danner, Biglari Holdings Shareholders Drop Effort to Stop Special Meeting, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.expressnews.com/business/local/article/
Biglari-Holings-shareholders-drop-effort-to-stop-12823122.php [https://perma.cc/KNB5-CRMT] 
(“There’s pretty broad consensus among investors and people who study investments that multiple 
share classes with different voting rights are not a positive for firm value or shareholder value . . . .”); 
Letter from Anne Sheehan, Dir. of Corp. Governance, California State Teachers’ Retirement System, 
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called the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), whose members collectively 
manage over three trillion dollars in assets, has been actively lobbying to curtail 
dual-class structures.25 More recently, the 2017 IPO for shares of the social media 
company Snap Inc., which granted public investors no voting rights at all, caused 
a major uproar in the investment community.26 
Much theoretical legal and empirical economic scholarship supports 
arguments on both sides of whether dual-class voting structures should be 
allowed at all.27 The policy justifications for regulating dual-class structures 
are rooted in the presence of collective action problems, agency cost issues, 
and potential for abuse, such as the insider’s ability to secure perquisites at 
the expense of other shareholders.28 Perhaps the best counterargument 
against prohibiting dual-class stock structures altogether is that they ought to 
be considered in the broader context: the declining number of public 
companies in the United States and private enterprises choosing to remain 
private longer to pursue growth and create value without fear of interference 
from public markets, which can be more short-term oriented.29 Even though 
dual-class structures can be good, nonvoting shareholders are underprotected. 
 
to Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/
files/file-attachments/2017-08-17_hkex_listing_stds_new_board_main_board.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BH9T-V77H] (“CalSTRS believes equal voting and control rights proportional to economic interest 
represents [sic] best governance practice. We believe a structure that sustains ‘one-share one-vote’ 
equally aligns shareowners’ economic interests.”). 
25 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org [https://perma.cc/H6R9-
JXNB] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (declaring the elimination of dual-class stock as one of the 
organization’s top “priorities” and proclaiming that “[e]ach share of a public company’s common 
stock should have one vote”). 
26 See, e.g., Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017) (“This is an initial public 
offering of shares of non-voting Class A common stock of Snap Inc.”); Trevor Hunnicutt, S&P 500 
to Exclude Snap After Voting Rights Debate, REUTERS (July 31, 2017 9:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-snap-s-p/sp-500-to-exclude-snap-after-voting-rights-debate-idUSKBN1AH2RV (“Snap’s 
$3.4 billion March IPO was the third-largest ever for a U.S. tech company but some investors were 
taken aback by the company’s unusual decision to offer new investors a class of common stock with 
no voting rights.”); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-
evan-spiegel.html  (“Snap Inc. is aiming to adopt the most shareholder-unfriendly governance in an 
initial public offering, ever.”). 
27 See infra notes 120–142 and accompanying text. 
28 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976). For an extensive summary of the academic literature, see Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 
One Share–One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 52 (2008), which notes that the 
dominant view in the literature is that “the ‘one share–one vote’ principle is desirable” and that 
“concentrated control in the hands of a few leads to agency and entrenchment problems.” 
29 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Dearth of I.P.O.s, but It’s Not the Fault of Red Tape, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/dealbook/fewer-ipos-regulation-stock-
market.html (documenting that “the total number of companies listed on the United States stock market 
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In this Comment, I predominately focus on the extreme example of 
nonvoting common stock and argue that this amounts to disenfranchisement 
of public shareholders and necessitates modest reform.30 Part I considers the 
traditional protections of ordinary shareholders and provides relevant 
background information on dual-class structures. Part II explores the legal 
rights and entitlements for nonvoting shares of common stock. Part III 
studies and suggests potential solutions to the issues posed by nonvoting 
stock. Current forms of regulation, whether supported by private ordering 
arguments or external regulation arguments, do not accomplish enough in 
addressing the problems posed by nonvoting stock. I advance a novel 
multipronged framework for regulating nonvoting stock. First, federal 
securities laws could enable nonvoting shares to cast nonbinding votes. 
Second, state corporate laws ought to legally mandate that nonvoting 
shareholders have the right to attend annual meetings in an observer role. 
Third, state courts should impose a heightened standard of judicial review for 
companies with dual-class structures to encourage the use of procedures that 
empower shareholder votes. Fourth, nonvoting shares ought to have 
additional voting rights in some specific contexts as a matter of positive law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Part I explores the traditional protections of ordinary shareholders and 
provides relevant background information on dual-class structures. Section 
I.A explores voting rights, fiduciary duties, and statutory appraisal rights as 
the three primary shareholder protections. Section I.B provides a historical 
perspective on unequal voting arrangements. Section I.C studies the rising 
popularity of dual-class structures. Section I.D examines the empirical 
performance of dual-class structures vis-à-vis “one vote, one share” 
arrangements based on financial and economic data. Section I.E provides the 
normative arguments for and against such devices. 
 
plummeted by nearly half” between 1996 and 2016); see also Adena Friedman, The Promise of Market 
Reform: Reigniting America’s Economic Engine, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(May 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/18/the-promise-of-market-reform-reigniting-
americas-economic-engine [https://perma.cc/3M7F-VSNZ] (stating that “[Nasdaq] support[s] dual class 
structures in appropriate situations” and that to maintain America’s status as a “magnet for 
entrepreneurship and innovation . . . we must offer entrepreneurs multiple paths [including the choice 
of employing dual-class stock structures] to participate in public markets”). 
30 Perhaps unsurprisingly, “disenfranchise” in the corporate law context has entered the financial 
lexicon. See ERIK BANKS, THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, INVESTMENT AND 
BANKING 159 (2010) (defining “disenfranchise” as “[t]he process of removing voting rights from a class of 
common stock so that investors in that class are only entitled to rent rights”). 
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A. Three Traditional Stockholder Protection Devices 
Decisionmaking authority in corporations is allocated between shareholders 
and managers, including directors and executive officers. One key attribute of 
all business corporations is the delegation of formal authority to a board of 
directors to manage corporate affairs.31 As Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL) stipulates: “The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”32 In other 
words, “corporate law typically vests principal authority over corporate affairs 
in a board of directors or similar body that is periodically elected . . . by the 
firm’s shareholders.”33 As Chancellor Bill Allen famously wrote in the 1980s 
amidst the backdrop of a merger wave, “While corporate democracy is a 
pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors, 
not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.”34 
In our American model of corporate governance, shareholders have three 
essential protections under state corporate law: voting rights, fiduciary 
principles imported from agency law,35 and statutory appraisal remedies. 
 
31 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is 
Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 1, 5 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW]; see also id. (“[T]he five 
core structural characteristics of the business corporation are: (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, 
(3) transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership 
by contributors of equity capital.”). 
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018). 
33 Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12. 
34 TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. No. 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). 
35 One example of such principles goes as far back as 1928: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of 
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior . . . . Only thus has the 
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the 
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court. 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). More recently, the Delaware Chancery Court 
has announced: 
Fiduciaries are held by the common law to a high standard in fulfilling their 
stewardship over the assets of others, a standard that . . . may not be the same as that 
contemplated by ideal corporate governance . . . . Fiduciaries who act faithfully and 
honestly on behalf of those whose interests they represent are indeed granted wide 
latitude in their efforts to maximize shareholders’ investment. 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697-98 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
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1. Traditional Voting Rights of Voting Shares 
“Generally, the right to vote is a right that is inherent in and incidental to 
the ownership of corporate stock.”36 Not surprising then, “one share, one 
vote” is the default rule in U.S. corporate law.37 Voting rights include two 
distinct types of privileges, appointment rights and decision rights, which 
enable shareholders to exert direct influence over managers.38 Voting 
shareholders are generally entitled to vote on the election of directors;39 the 
removal of directors;40 any proposed amendments to the certificate of 
incorporation;41 the approval of major transactions, including mergers or 
consolidations,42 substantial sales of assets,43 and general dissolution;44 as well 
as other governance matters brought to stockholder meetings.45 The fact that 
the board is elected by shareholders “help[s] assure that the board remains 
responsive to the interests of the firm’s owners, who bear the costs and 
 
36 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2025 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2017). 
37 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2018) (“Unless otherwise provided in the 
certificate of incorporation . . . each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital 
stock held by such stockholder.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.21(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(“[U]nless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each outstanding share, regardless of 
class, is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.”); see also 
FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 36, § 2026 (“Generally, each outstanding share of corporate stock, 
regardless of class, is entitled to one vote, unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.”). 
38 See generally John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic 
Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra 
note 31, at 49, 49-77. These two rights are particularly strong in countries where the presence of 
controlling shareholders is common. Id. at 49. 
39 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2018) (stating that “[d]irectors shall be elected by a 
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and 
entitled to vote on the election of directors” (emphasis added)). 
40 See § 141(k) (stating that “[a]ny director or the entire board of directors may be removed, 
with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of 
directors” (emphasis added)). 
41 See § 242(b)(2) (“The holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote 
as a class upon a proposed amendment . . . .”). 
42 See § 251(c) (“[T]he agreement [of merger or consolidation] shall be considered and a vote 
taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled 
to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the 
agreement . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
43 See § 271(a) (“Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors . . . sell, lease 
or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets . . . when and as authorized by a 
resolution adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled 
to vote thereon . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
44 See § 275(b) (“[A] vote shall be taken upon the proposed dissolution. If a majority of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall vote for the proposed dissolution, 
a certification of dissolution shall be filed . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
45 See § 216(2) (“In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of the 
majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on 
the subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
506 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 497 
benefits of the firm’s decisions.”46 Moreover, the right to remove directors 
even more than the power to elect directors is considered an effective 
mechanism for managing agency costs.47 
Furthermore, voting rights of individual shareholders must also be 
considered in the context of the diffusion of ownership or the lack thereof. 
Described in quintessential Berle and Means fashion, “[t]he . . . governance 
structure of the large American firm—distant shareholders, a board of 
directors that has . . . deferred to the CEO, and powerful, centralized 
management—is usually seen as a natural economic outcome arising from 
specialization: shareholders would specialize in riskbearing but wanted 
diversification, and firms needed specialized, professional management.”48 
However, diffuse, fragmented ownership is not necessarily the norm for large, 
modern American corporations.49 On the contrary, during the twenty-first 
century, we now observe that ownership of publicly traded American 
enterprises has been reconcentrated among a few large institutional 
investment intermediaries, including pension funds and mutual funds.50 
Mutual funds hold approximately one-fourth of the stock of publicly traded 
companies in the U.S. and thus “have the power to be a significant force in 
the governance of large U.S. corporations.”51 In fact, when considered 
together, just three firms (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) represent 
the single largest shareholder in forty percent of all listed American 
corporations and eighty-eight percent of S&P 500 member firms.52 
Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis of Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) data demonstrates that there is “remarkably high” internal agreement 
in proxy voting by each of these “Big Three” firms and suggests each firm 
implements a coordinated voting strategy across the various mutual funds 
 
46 Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12. 
47 Armour et al., supra note 38, at 55. 
48 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE at ix (1994). 
49 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (describing the “polarization of corporate 
structure” between a “Dispersed Ownership System, characterized by strong securities markets, rigorous 
disclosure standards, and high market transparency, in which the market for corporate control 
constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism” and a “Concentrated Ownership System, characterized 
by controlling blockholders, weak securities markets, high private benefits of control, and low 
disclosure and market transparency standards, with only a modest role played by the market for 
corporate control, but with a possible substitutionary monitoring role played by large banks”). 
50 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 (2013) (“In 2011, for example, institutional 
investors owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.”). 
51 Id. at 886. 
52 Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive 
Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017). 
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that they manage.53 Also, these “Big Three” firms “side with management in 
more than ninety percent of votes.”54 
2. Fiduciary Duties and Judicial Standards of Review 
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders.55 Shareholders may seek to enjoin the actions of directors or 
officers for behavior that is inimical to their duties. Shareholders may also 
recover monetary damages for losses sustained for breaches of fiduciary 
duties. The two traditional duties owed to shareholders are the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty.56 
The duty of care generally requires directors to exercise reasonable care 
when making business decisions.57 Duty of care violations are analyzed under 
a “business judgment rule” standard of review.58 The business judgment rule 
is a rebuttable legal presumption that directors discharged their duties of care 
 
53 Id. at 316-17. 
54 Id. at 316. 
55 See, e.g., Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., No. 8626-VCL, 2013 WL 5967028, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 7, 2013) (emphasizing that “corporate directors do not owe fiduciary duties to individual 
stockholders” but rather “to the entity and to the stockholders as a whole” and stressing that “[t]his is 
true even if a single stockholder holds a controlling block”); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[A] board of directors is not a passive instrumentality.”). 
56 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.400 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(“[O]utside the recognized fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (and perhaps good faith), there are no 
other fiduciary duties. In certain circumstances, however, specific applications of the duties of care 
and loyalty are called for, such as so-called ‘Revlon’ duties and the duty of candor or disclosure.”). 
57 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Each member of the board of 
directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (i) in good faith, and (ii) in a manner 
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); PRINCIPLES OF 
CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (“A 
director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good 
faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and 
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like 
position and under similar circumstances.”). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018) 
(allowing corporations to have exculpatory “provision[s] eliminating or limiting the personal liability 
of a director to the corporation . . . for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty” in certain 
contexts, namely duty of care violations that do not amount to duty of good faith violations). 
58 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (“The 
business judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory 
authority to manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors.”). Compare Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439-449 (1993) (describing the duty of care as a standard of conduct and 
the business judgment rule as the applicable standard of review), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004) (“[T]he business 
judgment rule can [also] be seen as an abstention doctrine . . . [that] does not state a standard of 
liability but rather establishes a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims.”). 
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and loyalty.59 This puts the burden on the challenging plaintiff to proffer 
evidence for believing that there was a breach.60 In the absence of a showing, 
courts will give deference to directorial decisionmaking.61 It is very difficult 
for plaintiffs to make a showing and overcome the presumption.62 
The duty of loyalty includes a cluster of duties and generally applies when 
there is a conflict of interest of some sort.63 Duty of loyalty violations are evaluated 
under the “entire fairness” standard of review.64 Entire fairness doctrine is the 
most exacting level of judicial review since the corporation must prove that both 
the process it undertook and price it achieved are fair to its stockholders.65 In 
practice, this ends up being a very difficult burden for a board of directors or 
 
59 See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The 
business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company.” (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000))). 
60 See id. (“The burden is on plaintiffs, the party challenging the directors’ decision, to rebut 
this presumption.”). 
61 See id. (“Thus, absent an allegation of interestedness or disloyalty to the corporation, the 
business judgment rule prevents a judge or jury from second guessing director decisions if they were 
the product of a rational process and the directors availed themselves of all material and reasonably 
available information.”); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 678 (Mich. 1919) (“The 
management of the corporation and its affairs rests in the board of directors, and no court will 
interfere or substitute its judgment so long as the proposed actions are not ultra vires or fraudulent. 
They may be ill advised . . . but this is no ground for exercise of jurisdiction.”). 
62 See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (“The standard of director liability under the business 
judgment rule ‘is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.’”). 
63 See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02, 5.05 
(AM. LAW INST. 1994) (codifying duties owed to shareholders in transactions involving self-dealing and 
corporate opportunities); see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“[D]irectors can neither appear on both sides 
of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as 
opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.”). But see Stone 
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty 
is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also 
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”). 
64 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of fairness is 
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of 
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”). 
65 The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger stated that 
[t]he concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former 
embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, 
structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the 
directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to 
the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all 
relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other 
elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. However, the 
test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects 
of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. 
Id. at 711 (citations omitted). 
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controller to carry and induces parties to settle the litigation. Thus, it is evident 
that the applicable standard of review is often outcome determinative.66 
Fiduciaries also owe a duty of good faith,67 a duty of candor or disclosure 
in certain transaction settings,68 and other intermediate duties in particular 
takeover defense situations69 and sale of control contexts.70 
However, Delaware courts have recently accepted arguments rooted in the 
principle of shareholder ratification. Under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, a case 
referred to as MFW in the corporate lexicon, conditioning a transaction on 
the fully informed approval of both an empowered and independent special 
 
66 See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992) (“The choice of the applicable ‘test’ to 
judge director action often determines the outcome of the case.”). 
67 As the Delaware Supreme Court discussed in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care 
and loyalty, . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. A failure to act in good faith may be 
shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than 
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with 
the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails 
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 
duties. 
906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); cf. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does 
not establish an independent fiduciary duty [equal to] the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter 
two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may 
do so, but indirectly.”). 
68 See Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989) (“[W]hen a board of 
directors is required or elects to seek shareholder action, it is under a duty to disclose fully and fairly 
pertinent information within the board’s control.” (internal quotations omitted)); Lynch v. Vickers 
Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 1977) (requiring complete candor and full disclosure of “all 
the facts and circumstances” in a situation involving a controlling shareholder); cf. Malpiede v. 
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001) (“[T]he board’s fiduciary duty of disclosure . . . is not an 
independent duties [sic] but the application in a specific context of the board’s fiduciary duties of 
care, good faith, and loyalty.”). But see IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed ex. rel. Class A Stockholders of 
NRG Yield, Inc. v. Crane, No. CV 12742-CB, 2017 WL 6335912, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2018) 
(“Delaware law does not require management to discuss the panoply of possible alternatives to the 
course of action it is proposing.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
69 As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an 
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the 
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred . . . . We must bear in 
mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a 
threat to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are of 
necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult. 
493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). 
70 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(“The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”). 
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committee of directors and the informed vote of a majority of the unaffiliated 
stockholders can shift the standard of review from entire fairness to business 
judgment review in controlling shareholder transactions.71 Delaware has been 
willing to extend its “MFW framework,” applicable to squeeze-out 
transactions by controllers, to dismiss shareholder litigation and allow 
directors to avoid the entire fairness standard of review in dual-class 
recapitalization transactions.72 Under Corwin, the informed vote of 
disinterested stockholders can shift the standard of review from enhanced 
scrutiny to business judgment review in noncontrolling shareholder 
transactions.73 Transactions riddled with conflict and defective process can be 
cleansed by shareholders as long as there is adequate disclosure of “troubling” 
director behavior.74 With Corwin, a shareholder voting mechanism can 
otherwise cleanse a transaction where the board of directors would be deemed 
to have breached their fiduciary duties had the shareholder action been 
brought preclosing rather than postclosing.75 These recent doctrinal 
developments substantially weaken fiduciary duties as a shareholder 
protective device and purport to entrust the shareholder voting mechanism 
as a counterbalance. However, the voting mechanism is deficient and 
especially problematic for nonvoting shares. 
3. Appraisal Rights 
Finally, shareholders may have statutory appraisal rights under certain 
circumstances. Appraisal rights are essentially put rights requiring the 
 
71 See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the business 
judgment rule “should govern mergers between a controlling stockholder and its corporate 
subsidiary, where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an independent, 
adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed 
vote of a majority of the minority stockholders”). 
72 See NRG Yield, 2017 WL 6335912, at *9 (deciding reclassification transactions should be 
analyzed as a conflicted controller transaction). 
73 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305-06 (Del. 2015) (holding that the 
business judgment rule, as opposed to intermediate standards of review under Unocal or Revlon, is 
“invoked as the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages action when a merger that 
is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully informed, 
uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders” (emphasis added)). 
74 Id. at 312. 
75 As further stated in by the court in Corwin, 
[T]his Court has never held that the stockholders had to be asked separately to “ratify” 
the board’s actions for that effect to be given. Rather, it has been the ability of an 
uncoerced group of informed stockholders to freely accept for themselves whether a 
transaction was good for them that gave rise to the effect on the standard of review 
applied in any post-closing challenge. 
Id. at 312 n.24 (emphasis added). 
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corporation to buy out a dissenting shareholder’s stock at a court-determined 
price in specific merger transaction contexts.76 
However, there has been increased uncertainty around appraisal rights due to 
recent Delaware Court of Chancery decisions.77 Specifically, Delaware has been 
willing to recognize efficient capital markets theory in the appraisal context for 
companies with widely traded public stock and absent a controlling shareholder.78 
B. History of Unequal Voting Structures 
Unequal voting structures are not a recent phenomenon. Alexander 
Hamilton is perhaps prescient for articulating the tension between utilizing 
“one share, one vote” and “one shareholder, one vote” rules.79 Reporting to the 
House of Representatives in 1790 on a National Bank, Hamilton argued that 
[a] vote for each share renders a combination between a few principal 
stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits of the bank, too easy. An 
equal vote to each stockholder, however great or small his interest in the 
institution, allows not that degree of weight to large stockholders which it is 
reasonable they should have, and which, perhaps, their security and that of 
the bank require. A prudent mean is to be preferred.80 
 
76 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 262(a) (2018) (“Any stockholder . . . who has otherwise 
complied with [the conditions set forth in this statute] . . . shall be entitled to an appraisal by the 
Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock . . . .”). 
77 See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 
WL 922139, at *2, *54 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (using unaffected thirty-day average market price for 
estimating going concern value in an appraisal action, which represented a thirty percent discount 
to the merger consideration). But see Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 
No. 565, 2016, 2017 WL 6375829, at *5 (Del. Dec. 14, 2017) (finding that the trial court failed to 
adequately consider the deal price in determining the fair value of corporation’s stock). 
78 See Aruba, 2018 WL 922139 at *24 (noting the Delaware Supreme Court’s consideration of 
the unaffected trading price in appraisals where a “company’s shares trade in a market having 
attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying a traditional version of the semi-strong form 
of the efficient capital markets hypothesis”); see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 414 (1970) (“[T]here is consistent evidence of 
positive dependence in day-to-day price changes and returns on common stocks, and the dependence 
is of a form that can be used as the basis of marginally profitable trading rules.”). But cf. Air Prods. 
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (rejecting efficient markets theory and 
accepting “substantive coercion” as a valid threat for Unocal purposes in the takeover context). 
Substantive coercion is defined as “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced 
offer because they disbelieve management’s representations of intrinsic value.” Id. at 96 (quoting 
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There 
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 258 (1989)). 
79 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 1971–1980, 393 app. G, (W.S. Hein 1981). 
80 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK (1790), reprinted in 3 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 388, 423. Hamilton may have been more 
concerned with consumer protection than investor protection. See Henry Hansmann & Mariana 
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It has been documented that “[p]rior to the beginning of the [twentieth] 
century there existed but little restriction of the voting rights of 
shareholders.”81 An early instance of publicly traded nonvoting common stock 
in the United States concerned the International Silver Company, which 
employed such an equity security between 1898 and 1902—long before Snap 
Inc. offered nonvoting shares to the public.82 By May 1926, nine public 
companies in the United States employed a dual-class common stock structure 
with “two classes, alike . . . in all respects except that one class ha[d] voting 
power and the other none.”83 
One of the first known critics of the practice of corporations issuing nonvoting 
common shares to the public was William Z. Ripley, a Harvard professor of 
political economy.84 Ripley described the Wall Street practice of issuing nonvoting 
Class A common stock to the public while simultaneously reserving Class B 
common shares with voting rights for management as a “plague.”85 Years before 
Berle and Means famously examined the problem of “separation of ownership and 
control” in American corporations in the 1930s, Ripley reasoned that “the trouble 
has to do with the growing dissociation of ownership of property from 
responsibility for the manner in which it shall be put to use.”86 
It is said that the 1934 creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) was in part due to Ripley’s muckraking.87 By the 1980s, the New York Stock 
 
Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 
YALE L.J. 948, 979 (2014) (“[Hamilton] seemed particularly concerned with mitigating profit-
maximizing behavior by the Bank’s shareholders to the detriment of consumers, as well as with 
preventing favoritism in lending decisions.”). 
81 W.H.S. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J. 
ECON. 353, 353 (1926). 
82 Id. at 355. 
83 Id. at 360-61. These companies included “three of the leading tobacco companies: American, 
Liggett and Myers, and R. J. Reynolds.” Id. at 360. 
84 See Berle, supra note 20 at 674 (“Forcibly called to the attention of the public by a recent 
address of Professor Ripley, [non-voting shares] form one of the major problems which lie on the 
border line between corporation law and financial practice.”); When Ripley Speaks, Wall Street Heeds: 
From His Quiet Study This Harvard Professor Issues Sensational Indictments That Force Reforms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1926, at 7 (documenting Ripley’s concern for “non-voting stocks which . . . make 
still more secure the position of the professional financier as against the amateur speculator or 
investor”); see also, Stephen Mihm, Non-Voting Shares Don’t Have a Pretty History, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
16, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-16/non-voting-shares-don-t-
have-a-pretty-history (“The man who became the most vocal and effective opponent of non-voting 
shares was a largely forgotten Harvard economist named William Zebina Ripley.”). Professor Ripley, 
despite his accomplishments, has since been discredited on other grounds. See id. (“His obscurity may 
have been earned by his earlier work as a promoter of ‘scientific racism’ at the turn of the century.”). 
85 WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 86-89 (1927). 
86 Id. at 116. 
87 William Z. Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen! The Shareholder’s Right to Adequate Information, ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1926/09/stop-look-listen-the-shareholders-right-to-
adequate-information/308240/ [https://perma.cc/T9GY-76F6]. 
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Exchange (NYSE) mandated that listed companies adopt “one vote, one share” 
policies.88 Then, in 1984, General Motors sought to implement a dual-class voting 
structure by issuing common stock to the public with diminished voting 
entitlements of one-half vote per share.89 The NYSE lobbied the SEC to modify 
its policy.90 The SEC declined and proffered its own rule to regulate dual-class 
structures in 1988.91 Rule 19c–4 purported to prohibit “disenfranchisement” by 
banning national securities exchanges “from listing stock of a corporation that takes 
any corporate action with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing 
the per share voting rights of existing common stockholders.”92 Ultimately, 
however, the D.C. Circuit struck down this rule and held that the SEC had 
overstepped its authority as granted under section 19 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.93 Further, the D.C. Circuit held that “the SEC’s authority over 
shareholder voting is limited to disclosure and process; the SEC has no authority 
over the substance of shareholder voting, including the number of votes shares can 
possess. The substance of shareholder voting thus is solely and exclusively a matter 
for state corporate law.”94 In the aftermath, securities exchanges “adopted new 
listing standards governing the use of dual class stock.”95 
C. Prevalence of Unequal Voting Structures 
Today, publicly traded dual-class companies have an aggregate market 
capitalization in excess of three trillion dollars.96 The prevalence of dual-class 
voting structures has been on the rise.97 In fact, nearly 20% of 2017 IPOs in 
 
88 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Perpetual Dual Class Stock Versus the SEC’s Dubious Raised Eyebrow 
Power, WLF LEGAL PULSE (Feb. 23, 2018), https://wlflegalpulse.com/2018/02/23/perpetual-dual-
class-stock-versus-the-secs-dubious-raised-eyebrow-power/ [https://perma.cc/3XQ7-M5YY]. 
95 Id. 
96 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 594. 
97 See, e.g., John Plender, Dropbox IPO Is Yet Another Corporate Governance Low Point, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4333c554-279a-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (“[Dual-
class] listings increased in the US from 487 in 2005 to 701 in 2015, an eye-catching 44 per cent rise. 
Among those issuers have been high-profile tech companies such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, 
TripAdvisor and Zynga.”); Tom Zanki, More Cos. Authorizing No-Vote Shares Despite Resistance, 
LAW360 (July 12, 2017, 8:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/943458/more-cos-authorizing-
no-vote-shares-despite-resistance [https://perma.cc/4C3R-CWXU] (“More companies are 
establishing the right to issue nonvoting shares at their initial public offering through a triple-class 
stock structure, venturing beyond dual-class setups that already contain unequal voting rights favoring 
management’s ability to maintain long-term control, despite objections from institutional groups who 
say the practice erodes accountability.”). 
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the United States employed a structure with disproportionate voting rights.98 
By some estimates, 10% of all publicly traded companies in the U.S. “have 
some form of dual-class structure.”99 More specifically, as of March 2018, over 
two hundred Russell 3000 U.S. incorporated companies “have at least two 
outstanding classes of common stock with unequal voting rights.”100 Further, 
approximately 25% of these Russell 3000 dual-class stock companies have at 
least one class of common stock that is completely nonvoting.101 Snap Inc. 
appears to be the only company today that exclusively uses nonvoting stock 
for its publicly traded shares.102 
When Google went public, its insiders readily admitted that its then dual-class 
structure was considered “unusual” for a technology business, although not 
uncommon for a modern media enterprise.103 Less than one decade later, Google’s 
 
98 Large Majority of 2017 IPOs were One Share, One Vote, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., 
https://www.cii.org/files/Board%20Accountability/2017%20IPO%20Stats%20for%20Website.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GHN5-7Q3R] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). Specifically, of the 124 IPOs launched 
in 2017—excluding foreign private issuers, special purpose acquisition companies, and master 
limited partnerships—twenty-three utilized dual-class structures with unequal voting rights, and 
four employed nonvoting shares. Id. 
99 DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A CLOSER 
LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 65 (2d ed. 2016). This 
statistic is based on 2014 data. Id. at 76 n.24. 
100 Dual Class Companies List, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., https://www.cii.org/files/
Board%20Accountability/Dual%20Class%20Company%20List%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SZC-
MTGZ] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). Interestingly, there is a handful of companies with dual-class stock 
structures that have two equity securities that are both publicly traded on major market exchanges, 
including Alphabet Inc. (tickers GOOG and GOOGL); Under Armour Inc. (tickers UA and UAA); 
Twenty-First Century Fox Inc. (tickers FOXA and FOX); Discovery Communications, Inc. (tickers 
DISCA and DISCK); Viacom, Inc. (tickers VIA and VIAB); and News Corp. (tickers NWS and NWSA). 
See Karen Wallace, Which Stock Share Class Should You Buy?, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=820137 [https://perma.cc/TV8M-XLK7] (listing 
companies with multiple share classes and tickers); Bermuda Meister, FOX vs. FOXA: Unusual Disparity 
Between Voting and Non-Voting Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (Dec. 26, 2016), https://seekingalpha.com/article/
4032703-fox-vs-foxa-unusual-disparity-voting-non-voting-shares [https://perma.cc/2959-XYV2] (listing 
public companies with public voting stock and public nonvoting stock). 
101 Dual Class Companies List, supra note 100. This descriptive statistic was based on a 
computational analysis of CII’s compiled raw data. 
102 See Snap Inc., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4) at 7 (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Snap 
Prospectus] (“We are not aware of any other company that has completed an initial public offering 
of non-voting stock on a U.S. stock exchange.”). 
103 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at iii (Apr. 29, 2004) (“The New York 
Times Company, the Washington Post Company and Dow Jones, the publisher of The Wall Street 
Journal, [as of 2004] all have similar dual class ownership structures.”). Media companies used dual-
class structures to protect journalistic integrity and “focus on journalism ahead of profit.” Andrew 
Ross Sorkin & Geraldine Fabrikantoct, Big Holder Sells Stake in Times Co., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/business/media/18paper.html; see also Katie Bentel & 
Gabriel Walter, Dual Class Shares (Spring 2016) (unpublished seminar paper, University of 
Pennsylvania), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/fisch_2016/2 [https://perma.cc/V33L-CX7R] 
(“Dual class stocks were first utilized in media companies as a means to protect the journalistic 
integrity of the news.”). 
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cofounders professed that “[g]iven Google’s success, it’s unsurprising that this 
type of dual-class governance structure is now somewhat standard among newer 
technology companies.”104 Notable examples of technology businesses that 
launched IPOs with dual-class structures besides Alphabet and Snap include Blue 
Apron, Facebook, and Zynga105 as well as Dropbox106 and Spotify.107 Most 
recently, in 2019, Lyft108 and Pinterest109 are the latest nascent technology 
businesses to utilize dual-class governance structures. 
 
104 Page & Brin, supra note 6. 
105 See, e.g., Caitlin Huston, Snap Backlash, Facebook Capitulation Won’t Stop Founder-Friendly 
Stock Structures, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 27, 2017, 7:24 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
snap-backlash-facebook-capitulation-wont-stop-multi-class-stock-structures-2017-09-22 
[https://perma.cc/2WDB-QBBN] (arguing that “dual-class structures that offer limited voting 
powers are likely here to stay”). 
106 See Dropbox, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 158 (Feb. 23, 2018) (“The rights of 
the holders of Class A common stock, Class B common stock, and Class C common stock are identical, 
except with respect to voting and conversion.”); see also Maureen Farrell & Jay Greene, Dropbox Files 
for Its Initial Public Offering, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
dropbox-files-to-go-public-1519419035 [https://perma.cc/48JB-PWES] (“Despite a pushback against 
dual-class shares from index funds and the SEC in recent months, Dropbox will have a dual-class 
structure that gives the founders and some investors 10 votes a share, compared with one vote a share 
for investors buying shares in the public markets.”). 
107 See Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) at 2 (Feb. 28, 2018) (“Each 
outstanding ordinary share entitles the holder thereof to one vote. In addition, we have issued ten 
beneficiary certificates . . . [to] our founders . . . . The beneficiary certificates carry no economic 
rights and are issued to provide the holders of such beneficiary certificates additional voting rights.”); 
see also Lucas Shaw, Spotify’s Founders Aren’t Giving Up Control Any Time Soon, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 
2018, 8:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-21/spotify-s-founders-aren-t-
giving-up-control-any-time-soon (“[Spotify’s founders] own a class of stock that assures their hold on 
the company after the shares begin trading . . . . Another class will be tradeable by investors.”). 
108 See Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 11 (Mar. 1, 2019) (“The dual class 
structure of our common stock will have the effect of concentrating voting power with our Co-
Founders . . . which will limit your ability to influence corporate matters, including the election of 
directors, amendments of our organizational documents and any merger, consolidation, sale of all or 
substantially all of our assets or other major corporate transactions."); see also Shannon Bond, 
Investors Call for Lyft to Scrap Dual-Class Share Structure Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7d26dca6-4747-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 ("With a dual-class structure, 
Lyft is basically shielding itself and company insiders against shareholders who deserve a voice."). 
109 See Pinterest, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 7 (Mar. 22, 2019) (“The dual class 
structure of our common stock will have the effect of concentrating voting control with those 
stockholders who held our capital stock prior to the completion of this offering, including our co-
founders, executive officers, employees and directors and their affiliates. This will limit or preclude 
your ability to influence corporate matters."); see also Olivia Zaleski & Selina Wang, Pinterest Joins U.S. 
IPO Wave with Fast Revenue Growth, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-03-22/pinterest-joins-wave-of-upcoming-unicorn-ipos-with-u-s-filing ("Pinterest will 
have a dual-class structure, with its Class B shares carrying the voting rights of 20 ordinary shares."). 
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D. Empirical Analysis of Unequal Voting Structures 
Statistical analysis has long revealed that when a corporation has two classes 
of common stock outstanding that differ only with regards to voting rights, the 
class with superior voting rights often trades at a premium relative to the class 
with inferior voting rights.110 Such price differentials have historically been found 
to be within a range of three to five percent across various empirical studies.111 
One recent study conducted by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) 
found that “[c]ontrolled companies generally underperformed non-controlled 
firms . . . in terms of total shareholder returns, revenue growth, and return on 
equity.”112 Still, the explanation for these findings is not necessarily causal in 
nature since the results may be subject to omitted variable bias and fraught with 
endogeneity issues. For example, the premium for superior voting shares may 
be due to confounding factors such as family control.113 In fact, an empirical 
study of stock market returns found that dual-class firms with controlling 
families generate excess returns while dual-class firms without family owners 
“bear no significant relation to stock returns.”114 This same study concludes “that 
a super voting arrangement—in-and-of itself—does not appear to be 
inconsistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.”115 
Nonetheless, one statistical analysis of dual-class shares used clever 
empirics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and “disentangle the incentive and 
entrenchment effects in the relationship of insider ownership and firm 
value.”116 On average, “insiders have approximately 60% of the voting rights 
 
110 See Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control 
in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 458 (1983) (finding that “when corporations have 
only voting and non-voting common stock outstanding, the voting stock trades at a premium” and that 
when corporations have two classes of voting common stock but one class has “voting rights that can 
be identified as being superior . . . , the one with superior voting rights trades at a premium”). 
111 Aaron Stumpf & Andrew Cline, Price Differentials Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, STOUT, 
https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/price-differentials-between-voting-and-nonvoting-stock 
[https://perma.cc/8LUD-KN97] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). But cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual 
Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (1987) (“A stock’s limited 
voting rights are reflected in a reduced price, so that the company’s owners at the time it goes public, 
and not the purchasers, bear the cost.”). 
112 Press Release, Inv’r Responsibility Research Ctr. Inst., Controlled Companies Generally 
Underperform and Boards Less Diverse, New Study Finds (Mar. 17, 2016), http://irrcinstitute.org/
news/controlled-companies-generally-underperform-and-boards-less-diverse-new-study-finds/ 
[https://perma.cc/M3WM-U2RA]. 
113 See Ronald Anderson, Ezgi Ottolenghi & David Reeb, The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair 2, 
5 (Fox Sch. Bus., Research Paper No. 17-021, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3006669 (finding an “association between founding family ownership and dual class firms” and further 
“suggesting [that] the premium centers on family control rather than dual class shares”). 
114 Id. at 5. 
115 Id. at 8. 
116 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 15, at 1084. 
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and 40% of the cash-flow rights in dual-class firms.”117 Further, in 
approximately “one-third of all dual-class firms, the insiders have a majority of 
the voting rights [amounting to effective control] but do not have a majority of 
the cash-flow rights.”118 The researchers found that “firm value is positively 
associated with insiders’ cash-flow rights and negatively associated with 
insiders’ voting rights, and negatively associated with the wedge between the 
two.”119 As the disparity between voting rights and economic rights for insiders’ 
ownership interest in the firm grows, firm value decreases. With unequal voting 
structures, not only does the class of stock with inferior voting rights trade at a 
relative discount to the class of stock with superior voting rights, but all 
shareholders, regardless of class of stock held, suffer from lower valuations. 
E. Normative Arguments For and Against “One Share, One Vote” 
There are reasonable arguments on both sides of the “one share, one vote” 
debate. Dual-class stock structures enable entrepreneurs to retain corporate 
control while focusing on long-term value creation without fear of 
shareholder retribution for short-term performance hiccups. However, the 
risk is that dual-class structures can also misalign incentives, promote 
entrenchment, and expropriate resources because founders with corporate 
control can outvote ordinary shareholders. 
1. Arguments in Favor of “One Share, One Vote” 
Arguments for “one share, one vote” regimes are often viewed through an 
economic lens by adopting a contractarian theory and surmising that “a 
corporation is just a name for a great web of contractual arrangements.”120 
 
117 Id. at 1053. 
118 Id. at 1056-57. 
119 Id. at 1084. “Wedge” is defined as “insider voting rights minus insider cash-flow rights.” Id. 
at 1073; cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Cost of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 
410-11 (2005) (finding that staggered boards—arrangements that protect incumbent board 
members—are associated with a statistically significant and economically meaningful reduction in 
firm value, while controlling for other governance provisions). 
120 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 
401 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbook & Fischel, Voting] (citing Michael Jensen & Wiliam Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976)). But see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 8 (2012) (listing 
“incorrect factual claims about the economic structure of corporations, including the mistaken claims 
that shareholders ‘own’ corporations, that they have the only residual claim on the firm’s profits, and 
that they are ‘principals’ who hire and control directors to act as their ‘agents’”); Anat R. Admati, A 
Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132 (2017) (asserting that 
“[t]he important real-world issues around corporate governance do not fit neatly into most common 
economic frameworks and models”). See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
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Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, proponents of shareholder value 
maximization theory as well as “one share, one vote” voting policies, assert 
that the “shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income” and 
claim that “the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives . . . 
to make discretionary decisions.”121 They go on to argue that “[t]he 
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal 
costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion.”122 
To put it succinctly, “[t]he case for the one share, one vote rule turns 
primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power and 
to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on bad management.”123 
Dual-class governance structures promote the shifting of control “from good 
hands to bad because those who are willing to abuse control will often value it 
more than those who will not.”124 As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, 
[A]lthough the collective choice problem prevents dispersed shareholders 
from making the decisions day by day, managers’ knowledge that they are 
being monitored by those who have the right incentives, and the further 
knowledge that the claims could be aggregated and votes exercised at any 
time, tends to cause managers to act in [the] shareholders’ interest in order 
to advance their own careers and to avoid being ousted.125 
The fact that coalitions of shareholders may gain control for any period 
of time is seen as advantageous since this can minimize the collective choice 
problem that remains.126 Although a coalition of shareholders may collectively 
amass effective control, economic efficiency is achieved when minority 
shareholders have an equal opportunity of joining a succeeding coalition.127 
As disparity between voting rights and economic rights grows, agency costs 
and monitoring costs increase.128 
 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (arguing that the rules 
and enforcement mechanisms of corporate law replicate contractual provisions governing managers, 
investors, and other constituencies involved). 
121 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 120, at 403. 
122 Id. 
123 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996). 
124 Id. at 1946. 
125 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 120, at 403. 
126 Id. at 406. 
127 See id. (“So long as each share has an equal chance of participating in a winning coalition, 
the gains from monitoring will be apportioned so as to preserve appropriate incentives at the 
margin.” (emphasis added)). 
128 Id. at 409 (“The greater the departure from equal weighting of votes among residual 
claimants, the greater the (unnecessary) agency costs.”). 
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2. Arguments Against “One Share, One Vote” 
In contrast, viewed through this same economic lens and given the collective 
choice problem, opponents may argue that voting rights ought to “be held by a 
small group with good access to information—the managers themselves.”129 Some 
scholars oppose the conventional wisdom evinced by Easterbrook and Fischel and 
argue that the “one share, one vote” paradigm is rooted in flawed assumptions 
since shareholders do not necessarily have uniform preferences.130 Others pose the 
“question of whether dual-class firms possess . . . countervailing governance 
mechanisms such as outside directors, family ties, stronger pay-for-performance, 
or stronger monitoring by outside blockholders.”131 
Those who promote dual-class regimes and the ability of companies to 
deviate from the “one share, one vote” rule put forth private ordering 
arguments and contend that “informed parties will choose optimal 
arrangements on their own.”132 With dual-class voting structures, 
“[m]anagement . . . is protected from losing their positions without their 
consent” and “non-controlling shareholders are . . . protected from coercive 
takeover tactics and from making the mistake of selling the company too 
cheaply because they lack information possessed by the controlling 
shareholders.”133 Additionally, controllers “may use super voting shares to 
mitigate asymmetric information problems [and] protect firm specific 
investments.”134 Simply stated, “the founder of a company may have the 
special skills and deep knowledge of a specific industry and business to make 
her uniquely fit to be at the helm.”135 
 
129 Id. at 403. 
130 See generally Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775 
(2005) (arguing that the preferences of shareholders are not likely to be homogenous, particularly 
when they hold “economically encumbered” or “legally encumbered” shares). 
131 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 15, at 1059 (internal citations omitted). For example, 
some researchers have suggested that debt may be used as an “alternative control mechanism” in 
firms with dual-class structures. Id. 
132 Black & Kraakman, supra note 123, at 1946; see also Bernard Sharfman, A Private Ordering 
Defense of a Company’s Right To Use Dual Class Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2018) (“[T]he use 
of the dual class share structure in IPOs is a value-enhancing result of the bargaining that takes place 
in the private ordering of corporate governance arrangements . . . .”); David J. Berger, Dual Class Stock 
and Private Ordering: A System That Works, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(May 24, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-private-ordering-a-
system-that-works [https://perma.cc/KR7V-FXUF] (“Private ordering allows boards, investors, and 
other corporate stakeholders to determine the most appropriate capital structure for a particular 
company, given its specific needs.”). 
133 Gilson, supra note 111, at 811. See generally Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 
48 (Del. Ch. 2011) (providing a more in-depth discussion on the threat of substantive coercion and 
the use of poison pills as an alternative defensive measure). 
134 Anderson et al., supra note 113, at 4. 
135 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 604. 
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Some opponents of “one share, one vote” regimes have further advanced 
such private ordering arguments by reasoning that “nonvoting shares can be 
used to allocate voting power to informed investors who value their voting 
rights and are motivated to use them to maximize the firm’s value.”136 These 
opponents conjecture that the use of nonvoting shares may be used to reduce 
agency and transaction costs.137 The underlying rationale is that 
there may be companies that are made worse off when all shareholders vote. 
Some shareholders, including many retail investors, have no interest in 
learning about the company and prefer to free-ride off informed investors. 
Other passive shareholders, such as index funds, may lack financial incentives 
to vote intelligently because of their investment strategy.138 
In other words, passive shareholders may contribute to agency costs by 
choosing to vote if they are uninformed or apathetic. 
However, these same advocates of nonvoting shares admit that one 
complication is that “the effect of issuing nonvoting stock has generally been to 
keep voting control with company insiders, rather than empower outside 
investors.”139 They further point out that “the presence of nonvoting shares 
could exacerbate the collective action, free riding, and passivity problems 
inherent in dispersed ownership” but still conclude that this issue is ultimately 
unlikely.140 
SEC Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr., summarizes the debate over “one 
share, one vote” and dual-class structures quite succinctly: “On one hand, you have 
visionary founders who want to retain control while gaining access to our public 
markets. On the other, you have a structure that undermines accountability: 
management can outvote ordinary investors on virtually anything.”141 
II. THE SCOPE OF LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NONVOTING SHARES 
Part II explores the legal rights and entitlements for nonvoting shares of 
common stock. Specifically, Section II.A examines legal rights under state law 
and Section II.B explores legal rights under federal law and stock exchange rules. 
 
136 Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STANFORD 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028173). 
137 Id. at 4 (“[A] company that offers nonvoting shares to the public can lower its cost of capital 
in certain cases . . . because it reduces inefficiencies associated with voting.”). 
138 Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case for Nonvoting Stock, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:10 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-nonvoting-stock-1504653033. 
139 Lund, supra note 136, at 7. 
140 Id. at 34. 
141 Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The 
Case Against Corporate Royalty (Feb. 15, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/KMN6-LQQU]). 
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A. State Law Protections for Nonvoting Stockholders 
State law provides enormous flexibility for corporations to issue stock 
with different voting entitlements, including stock with no voting rights at 
all.142 As a general matter, a “shareholder cannot be deprived of the right to 
vote . . . her stock nor may the right be essentially impaired, either by the 
legislature or by the corporation, without the shareholder’s consent.”143 Thus, 
it follows that nonvoting shares must be either established at the moment of 
incorporation or when an amendment proposal altering voting entitlements 
is put to a vote and agreed upon by affected shareholders. 
Nonvoting stock is accurately defined as “[s]tock that has no voting rights 
under most situations.”144 This begs the question of which circumstances can 
give rise to voting entitlements for nonvoting stock. Expectedly, holders of 
nonvoting common stock are granted some substantive voting rights in the 
narrowest of circumstances.145 
1. Appointment Rights 
Nonvoting shareholders lack appointment rights altogether as they do not 
participate in the election or removal of directors.146 The vestigial check that 
remains is the ability for a nonvoting shareholder to petition the Court of 
Chancery to determine the validity of any election147 or result of any 
shareholder vote.148 Thus, the use of nonvoting stock in extreme examples can 
effectively turn a traditional business corporation into what may look more 
like a business trust or nonprofit corporation.149 This is concerning because 
states employ a director-centric model of corporate governance, and the 
 
142 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2018) (“Every corporation may issue 1 or more 
classes of stock . . . any or all of which . . . may have such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting 
powers . . . , as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation.” (emphasis added)); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The articles of incorporation may 
authorize one or more classes or series of shares that . . . have special, conditional, or limited voting 
rights, or no right to vote . . . .”) (emphasis added)). 
143 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 36, § 2025. 
144 Stock, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
145 For example, just six DGCL sections appear to affirmatively bolster statuary provisions 
with language containing “whether voting or nonvoting” or “whether or not entitled to vote.” DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 204, 242, 251, 266, 355, 390 (2018). 
146 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
147 See tit. 8, § 225(a) (“Upon application of any stockholder . . . the Court of Chancery may 
hear and determine the validity of any election, appointment, removal or resignation of any director 
or officer of any corporation . . . .”). 
148 See tit. 8, § 225(b) (“Upon application of any stockholder . . . , the Court of Chancery may hear and 
determine the result of any vote of stockholders upon matters other than the election of directors or officers.”). 
149 Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12 (“Th[e] requirement of an elected board distinguishes the 
corporate form from other legal forms, such as nonprofit corporations or business trusts, which permit 
or require a board structure, but do not require election of the board by the firm’s (beneficial) owners.”). 
522 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 497 
inability to vote in directorial elections eradicates a fundamental check 
shareholders have on directors and directorial decisionmaking.150 
2. Decision Rights 
Shareholders of nonvoting common stock have only minimal decision 
rights. They cannot vote to approve many major transactions, including 
mergers, asset sales, or dissolution.151 Nonvoting stockholders can vote in only 
the most extreme fundamental change resolutions such as business entity 
conversions152 and transfers of domestication.153 Holders of nonvoting stock 
can affirmatively vote on proposed amendments to a certificate of 
incorporation in a few enumerated contexts.154 
3. Information Rights 
Shareholders of nonvoting stock enjoy limited information rights. The 
default rule is that holders of nonvoting shares are generally not entitled to 
notice of a shareholders’ meeting unless they are entitled to vote on a matter 
at such a meeting.155 Instead, such shareholders are only specifically entitled 
to notice of defective corporate acts156 and of merger agreements.157 
 
150 See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
152 See tit. 8, § 266(b) (“[A] resolution [of conversion] shall be submitted to the stockholders 
. . . . If all outstanding shares of stock of the corporation, whether voting or nonvoting, shall be 
voted for the adoption of the resolution, the conversion shall be authorized.”). 
153 See tit. 8, § 390(b) (“[A] resolution [to transfer to, or domesticate, or continue in a foreign 
jurisdiction] shall be submitted to the stockholders . . . . If all outstanding shares of stock of the 
corporation, whether voting or nonvoting, shall be voted for the adoption of the resolution, the 
corporation shall file . . . a certificate of transfer . . . .”). 
154 See tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (specifying that nonvoting shareholders can cast votes if an 
amendment would change the number of authorized shares, change the par value of their shares, “or 
alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect 
them adversely”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.04(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“If a 
proposed amendment would affect a series of a class of shares in one or more of the [specifically 
enumerated] ways . . . the holders of shares of that series are entitled to vote as a separate voting 
group on the proposed amendment.”). 
155 See tit. 8, § 222(b) (“[W]ritten notice of any meeting shall be given . . . to each stockholder 
entitled to vote at such meeting . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL., 
MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS, § 9.4 (3d ed., Supp. 2017) (“[T]he determination of whether or 
not a class vote is required may under applicable state law determine which stockholders are entitled 
to notice of a meeting.”). 
156 See tit. 8, §§ 204(d), 204(g) (specifying that notice must be given to stockholders “whether 
voting or nonvoting”). 
157 See tit. 8, § 251(c) (“Due notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed 
to each holder of stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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Interestingly, state corporate law does not address whether nonvoting 
shareholders have a right to attend annual shareholder meetings.158 The fact 
that nonvoting shareholders generally do not have a right of notice or a right 
to vote in shareholder meetings seems to support the conclusion that such 
shareholders do not have a right to attend.159 On the flip side, it is unclear 
whether a nonvoting shareholder plaintiff could ever successfully argue that 
controlling shareholders or directors breached their duty of candor or disclosure 
in the event she is barred from attending a shareholder meeting.160 Directors of 
corporations with voting shares in the hands of insiders and nonvoting shares 
in the hands of the public could conceivably dodge annual shareholder meetings 
if all directors are perpetually elected by unanimous written consent.161 
Although any shareholder may petition the Court of Chancery in an attempt 
to compel an annual meeting under certain circumstances,162 a nonvoting 
shareholder is likely to be unsuccessful under DGCL section 211 if the voting 
shareholders regularly act by unanimous written consent.163 
4. Inspection Rights 
Likewise, it is unclear whether and to what extent nonvoting stockholders 
may be entitled to inspection rights, where the burden of proof is on the 
 
158 See BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 154, § 8.3 (“[O]nly those who have the right to vote at the 
meeting have an enforceable right to attend the meeting . . . . Others with legitimate interests in 
the business of the corporation . . . also may be admitted to the meeting. . . . [But] any decision by 
management to extend admission to others is purely discretionary.”); see also tit. 8, § 228(a) 
(referencing a hypothetical “meeting at which all shares entitled to vote . . . were present” and leaving 
open the possibility that nonvoting shareholders may be present on a discretionary basis (emphasis 
added)); Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 5 (indicating that Snap “will invite holders of . . . 
[nonvoting] common stock to attend [the] annual meeting of stockholders” and implying that such 
invitation is discretionary rather than mandatory (emphasis added)); cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (“Merely because the General Corporation Law is 
silent as to a specific matter does not mean that it is prohibited.”). 
159 Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 2. 
160 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
161 See tit. 8, § 211(b) (“Stockholders may . . . act by [unanimous] written consent to elect 
directors . . . .”). 
162 See tit. 8, § 211(c) (“[I]f no date has been designated, for a period of 13 months after . . . 
[either] its last annual meeting or the last action by written consent to elect directors . . . , the Court 
of Chancery may . . . order a meeting to be held upon the application of any stockholder or director.”). 
163 See Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 3 n.22 (“[Section 211] does not specify that the ‘unanimous’ 
written consent only pertains to the voting stockholders, but that is the natural conclusion because 
nonvoting stockholders would not be entitled to vote to elect directors if the corporation were to hold an 
annual meeting.”). On the contrary, section 228 explicitly frames written consent in terms of requisite 
voting power. See tit. 8, § 228(a) (stating that actions may be taken without a meeting only where a 
consent is “signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes 
that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled to vote 
thereon were present and voted”). But cf. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 155, § 2.10 (“Attempts by 
companies, even in exceptional circumstances, to avoid annual meetings, have rarely succeeded.”). 
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corporation to demonstrate that the requesting shareholder has an “improper 
purpose”164 or “a purpose not germane to the meeting.”165 Any shareholder 
has the statutory right to inspect a company’s books and records “for any 
proper purpose”.166 However, the Chancery Court “has wide latitude in 
determining the proper scope of inspection . . . [and bears] the responsibility 
of . . . tailor[ing] the inspection to the stockholder’s stated purpose.”167 All 
shareholders also have the statutory right to examine the list of shareholders 
entitled to vote “for any purpose germane to the meeting.”168 Depending on 
the facts and circumstances, it is unclear whether a corporation could 
successfully argue that a nonvoting shareholder does not have a “purpose 
germane to the meeting” simply because she cannot vote.169 The best 
counterargument would be that a nonvoting shareholder would like to 
examine the shareholder list so she can identify and appeal to the shareholders 
who can vote—including the controlling group.170 
5. Exit Rights 
What remains then is the prospect of exit rights.171 That is, one backstop 
to severely limited voting rights is the ability of the nonvoting stockholder to 
sell her shares in the open market—as long as the marketplace for secondary 
shares is sufficiently liquid. For seasoned companies listed on major 
exchanges, adequate free float generally supports liquidity in their stocks. 
 
164 See tit. 8, § 220(c)(3) (“The burden of proof shall be upon the corporation to establish that 
the inspection such stockholder seeks is for an improper purpose.”). 
165 See tit. 8, § 219(b) (“The burden of proof shall be on the corporation to establish that the 
examination such stockholder seeks is for a purpose not germane to the meeting.”). 
166 Tit. 8, § 220(b). 
167 Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 569 (Del. 1997); see also tit. 
8, § 220(c) (“The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
whether or not the person seeking inspection is entitled to the inspection sought.”); tit. 8, 
§ 220(c)(3) (“The Court may, in its discretion, prescribe any limitations or conditions with reference 
to the inspection, or award such other or further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.”). 
168 Tit. 8, § 219(a). 
169 See Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 4 n.32 (remarking that a “corporation could take the 
position that the only purpose ‘germane to the meeting’ is voting, and that only a holder of voting 
stock can have that purpose”). But see 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.15 (3d ed. 2018 & Supp. 
2018) (“The purpose of a stockholder list is to give stockholders information necessary to making or 
influencing voting decisions . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
170 See Magill v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 128 A.2d 233, 237 (Del. 1956) (“Until the polls are 
closed a stockholder may change his vote, and one stockholder has the right to attempt to persuade 
another to do so.”). 
171 Cf. Armour et al., supra note 38, at 49 (noting that “where share ownership is dispersed in the 
hands of passive, uninformed investors, . . . appointment and decision rights are less effective, and more 
work is done by agent incentives” supported by standards of conduct and “disclosure rules to ensure 
more informed share prices and greater liquidity, which in turn make exit rights . . . more effective”). 
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However, empirical research suggests that shares of dual-class firms may suffer 
from higher premiums demanded by marketmakers and greater order 
execution difficulty.172 It is evident then that exit rights alone are a weak form 
of protection for shareholders, and more must be done to facilitate liquidity 
and promote greater market efficiency.173 
B. Other Legal Privileges for Nonvoting Stockholders 
The scope of other legal privileges and entitlements for nonvoting shares 
stems from various stock exchange rules and federal regulations, most notably 
securities laws. 
1. Stock Exchange Rules 
To start, the major stock exchanges in the U.S. mandate that listed 
companies hold annual shareholder meetings.174 The NYSE employs 
additional protections for holders of nonvoting common stock that go beyond 
the bounds of both state corporate law and federal securities laws. Specifically, 
the NYSE mandates that listed shares of nonvoting stock “meet all original 
listing standards”; all rights, apart from voting entitlements, should be 
“substantially the same” for both nonvoting and voting common stock; and 
“holders of any listed nonvoting common stock must receive all 
communications . . . sent generally to the holders of the voting securities of 
the listed company.”175 However, the Nasdaq contains no comparable 
provisions.176 On the contrary, the Nasdaq has been vocal in advocating for 
the use of dual-class stock structures.177 
 
172 See Joonghyuk Kim et al., Dual-Class Stock Splits and Liquidity 22 (Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://weatherhead.case.edu/departments/banking-and-finance/Documents/Dual-
classstocksplits_04242007.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGH7-ELCU] (“[I]nvestors face higher effective spreads, 
trades have larger price impact, and order execution difficulty increases following dual-class splits.”). 
173 See supra note 171. 
174 See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, LISTING RULES Rule 5620(a) (“Each Company listing 
common stock or voting preferred stock . . . shall hold an annual meeting of Shareholders no later 
than one year after the end of the Company’s fiscal year-end . . . .”); NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL Rule 302.00 (“Listed companies are required to hold an 
annual shareholders’ meeting during each fiscal year.”). 
175 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Rule 313.00. 
176 See Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 3 n.26 (“Nasdaq does not appear to have a comparable 
rule [to that of the NYSE].”). 
177 See Friedman, supra note 29 (noting that Nasdaq believes dual-class structures can be beneficial 
since they “allow investors to invest side-by-side with innovators and high-growth companies”). 
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2. Federal Laws 
Federal securities laws do little to enlarge the rights of nonvoting 
stockholders, particularly when a company exclusively issues nonvoting stock 
to the public.178 Federal securities laws significantly constrain the information 
rights and entitlements of nonvoting shareholders and even limit legal causes 
of action and remedies for nonvoting shareholders. 
Federal securities laws generally require companies with equity securities 
registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act to disseminate proxy 
materials or equivalent information statement when soliciting shareholder 
action.179 However, under section 14(c) of the Exchange Act, this mandate is 
inapplicable to corporations that only register nonvoting common stock.180 
Consequentially, “legal causes of action and remedies under Section 14 . . . 
for inadequate or misleading information . . . may not be available to holders 
of [nonvoting] common stock.”181 Snap Inc., which only issued nonvoting 
stock to the public, aptly disclosed these issues in its prospectus to 
investors.182 Snap Inc. further revealed that material information would be 
shared with investors through Form 8-K filings after corporate actions are 
taken—rather than through proxy statements or information statements 
which would otherwise contain more information and be shared before 
 
178 In other contexts, it is interesting to note that federal regulations prohibit nonvoting shares 
altogether. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 prohibits nonvoting shares in reorganized 
companies. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(6) (2012) (“[A] plan shall . . . provide for the inclusion in the 
charter of the [corporate] debtor . . . of a provision prohibiting the issuance of nonvoting equity 
securities . . . .”). The Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits nonvoting shares in registered 
management companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (“[E]very share of stock hereafter issued by a 
registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every 
other outstanding voting stock . . . .”). 
179 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to solicit . . . any 
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempt security) . . . .”). 
180 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(a) (“[T]he registrant shall transmit [an 
information statement] to every security holder of the class that is entitled to vote . . . in regard to any 
matter to be acted upon . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Johnston v. Wilbourn, 682 F. Supp. 879, 
883 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (“[S]ection 14(a) applies only to securities registered pursuant to section 12 of 
the 1934 Act . . . .”); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 155, § 4.3 (“Issuers subject to the 
reporting requirements solely by virtue of having filed a registration statement under the Securities 
Act of 1933 are not subject to the proxy rules.”). 
181 Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40; see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) 
(stating that Section 14(a) is intended to prevent “management . . . from obtaining authorization for 
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation” and to “control 
the conditions under which proxies may be solicited” to prevent abuses that frustrate the free exercise 
of stockholders’ voting rights (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
182 See Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 5 (explaining that because the common stock is 
nonvoting and the “only class of stock registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act,” Snap would 
“not be required to file proxy statements or information statements under Section 14 of the 
Exchange Act unless a vote of the Class A common stock is required by applicable law”). 
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corporate actions are taken.183 This delay in reporting material information 
can be injurious to investors who may trade shares “after a material event has 
taken place but before [the company has] disclosed any information about 
that event.”184 Snap’s rationale for dissemination of any information is 
perhaps rooted in its desire to discharge its duty of candor or disclosure.185 
Another cause for alarm is the fact that when a company exclusively issues 
nonvoting stock to the public, its significant shareholders are exempt from 
reporting obligations under sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act and can 
therefore lawfully evade periodic disclosure of beneficial ownership.186 Further, 
“significant stockholders, other than directors and officers, are exempt from the 
‘short-swing’ profit recovery provisions of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.”187 
In the case of Snap, consistent with Delaware corporate law, nonvoting 
stockholders are barred from nominating directors and from bringing matters 
before the annual meeting of shareholders.188 To make matters worse, 
nonvoting stockholders are not eligible to submit shareholder proposals under 
rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.189 
Furthermore, a corporation that is classified as an “emerging growth 
company” under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 
may elect to conform with reduced reporting requirements.190 For example, 
Snap is not required to have its independent registered public accounting 
firm audit internal controls over financial reporting under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, has reduced disclosure requirements regarding executive 
compensation, and is not required to hold nonbinding advisory votes on 
 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (indicating that material information would be disclosed “to ensure equal access and fair 
disclosure”). 
186 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘equity security’ . . . shall 
not include securities of a class of non-voting securities.”); see also Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40. 
187 Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) (“[A]ny profit 
realized by [a director or officer] from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity 
security of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be 
recoverable by the issuer . . . .”); Gibbons v. Malone, 703 F.3d 595, 604 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold 
that an insider’s purchase and sale of shares of different types of stock in the same company does 
not trigger liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), where 
those securities are separately traded, nonconvertible, and come with different voting rights.”); 
Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (setting forth conditions by which a transaction between 
an issuer and its officers or directors would be exempt from Section 16(b)). 
188 See Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40 (“[H]olders of our Class A common stock will be unable 
to bring matters before our annual meeting of stockholders or nominate directors at such meeting . . . .”). 
189 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (“In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have 
continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on 
the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal.” (emphasis added)). 
190 See Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101(a)(19), 126 Stat. 306, 309 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a(19), 78a 
note (2012)) (defining an “emerging growth company” as a business with “total annual gross revenues of 
less than $1,000,000,000”). 
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executive compensation under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.191 Further, as long as a company exclusively 
has publicly traded, nonvoting stock outstanding, it will effectively bypass 
“say-on-pay” and “say-on-frequency” provisions of Dodd–Frank.192 
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO ISSUES POSED BY NONVOTING 
SHARES 
Current forms of regulation do not adequately address the problems 
posed by nonvoting stock. I advocate for the use of a novel multipronged 
framework for regulating nonvoting stock. Part III explores current and 
prospective solutions to the issues posed by nonvoting stock. Section III.A 
canvases approaches that are already in the marketplace and argues that they 
are deficient. Section III.B advances a new multipronged framework for 
regulating nonvoting stock. 
A. Current Approaches to Regulating Dual-Class Structures 
There are a variety of ways that the current marketplace regulates the use 
of dual-class shares. Two forms of regulation, namely sunset provisions and 
guaranteed minimum board seat representation, are supported by private 
ordering arguments since corporate stakeholders—rather than an external 
regulating body—determine the capital structure. Other approaches include 
notions of requiring nonvoting stock to be a form of preferred stock with 
some type of cash flow preference and prohibiting dual-class companies from 
participating in stock market indices. These last two forms of regulation are 
supported by arguments favoring some manner of external regulation. 
 
191 Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40, 44. 
192 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21; Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute 
Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178, 100 SEC Docket 868 (Jan. 25, 2011); Paresh Dave, 
Snap Says Shareholders Won’t Have a ‘Say on Pay’ for Executives, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017 6:40 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-live-updates-snap-ipo-snap-says-shareholders-won-t-have-a-
1486650128-htmlstory.html (“[S]hares with no votes are not subject to federal proxy rules designed to 
give shareholders a say in corporate matters . . . .”); Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 1-2 (“[H]olders of 
nonvoting shares cannot vote on . . . corporate governance matters, including say-on-pay votes . . . .”). 
In the case of Alphabet, which has a tripartite class structure, for example, nonvoting stock does not 
participate in such advisory votes. See Alphabet Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A) at 7 (Apr. 28, 
2017) (indicating that “[h]olders of Class C capital stock have no voting power as to any items of business 
that will be voted on at the Annual Meeting” and that say-on-pay vote and say-on-frequency votes shall 
be held at the Annual Meeting). 
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1. Mandate Sunset Provisions for Dual-Class Companies 
One potential solution to regulating dual-class structures concerns 
mandating the use of “sunset provisions.” Sunset arrangements only permit 
dual-class structures for a set definite amount of time—subject to potential 
extensions and certain triggering events.193 Examples of companies that 
adopted fixed duration sunset provisions as of their IPOs include Fitbit, 
Groupon, Kayak, and Yelp.194 Advocates for sunset provisions argue that “even 
if a dual-class structure were to be efficient at the time of the IPO, it would 
likely become inefficient many years down the road.”195 In other words, a 
reduction in efficiency of dual-class companies over time necessitates the use 
of “finite-life” structures vis-à-vis “perpetual” arrangements at the IPO 
stage.196 To allow for flexibility, the duration of dual-class structure could be 
extended if approved by a majority of the shareholders unaffiliated with the 
controller.197 
A second form of sunset provision in the marketplace is a “triggering-event 
sunset” which mandates common stock unification from a dual-class structure 
into a unitary class upon the occurrence of a stipulated event, “such as the 
founder’s disability, death, or reaching of retirement age.”198 Examples of 
companies that adopted triggering-event sunset provisions as of their IPOs 
include Google, Groupon, LinkedIn, and Zynga.199 These arrangements 
implicitly support the contention that healthy founders ought to run the 
business for the foreseeable future. 
A third form of sunset provision is called an “ownership-percentage 
sunset” which mandates common stock unification into a single-class structure 
when a controller crosses a certain predetermined ownership percentage.200 
Examples of companies that adopted such provisions include LinkedIn and 
Zynga.201 These arrangements support the view that a controller ought to 
maintain a baseline level of economic interest to maintain sufficient 
“alignment of interest” with public investors.202 In practice, these provisions 
are largely symbolic in nature because thresholds are often set too low.203 
 
193 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 601-02 (defining sunset provisions as mechanisms 
that make the life of a dual-class structure finite). 
194 Id. at 618. 
195 Id. at 601. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 601-02. 
198 Id. at 619. 
199 Id. at 619 n.98. 
200 Id. at 620. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. Recall that a controller of high-vote stock entitled to ten-to-one voting rights can hold 
9.1% of the total number of shares to secure majority control. See supra note 14 and accompanying 
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Both “triggering-event sunsets” and “ownership-percentage sunsets” can be 
useful in conjunction with other regulations. However, mandating plain vanilla 
sunset provisions with fixed dual-class durations is problematic. It is difficult 
to identify the efficiency “sweet spot” for how long a company ought to 
maintain a dual-class structure ex ante. A collective action problem arises ex 
post when shareholders unaffiliated with the controller are allowed to vote to 
extend the company’s unification date. This is because an individual 
shareholder may believe it is in the best interests of the corporation to maintain 
a dual-class structure but may nonetheless vote to empower herself by voting 
against an extension. Additionally, in a tripartite class company, like Alphabet 
or Blue Apron, it is unclear whether unaffiliated low-vote shareholders and 
nonvoting shareholders ought to be treated the same or differently for voting 
purposes. Further, voting on extensions could lead to concerns of empty 
voting.204 For example, shrewd shareholders can borrow shares just prior to the 
record date and unwind their shares immediately following the record date so 
that they can vote while maintaining no economic interest. 
2. Guarantee a Minimum Level of Board Representation for Low-Vote 
Stockholders 
An alternative approach is to have a certain fixed percentage of board seats 
determined by shareholders who hold nonvoting stock or low-voting stock. 
This would at least give low-voting or nonvoting shareholders a dissenting 
voice on the board of directors even if their nominees would always get 
overruled on matters voted upon by the board. 
 
text. If a threshold is set at 9%, it will have no bearing on majority voting control, but will still 
substantially impact voting power once triggered. Consider the same hypothetical firm discussed 
previously: there are 1,000,000 shares of common stock, consisting of 90,910 high-vote shares entitled 
to 10 votes per share and 909,090 low-vote shares entitled to 1 vote per share. The 90,910 high-vote 
shares are entitled to 909,100 votes whereas the 909,090 low-vote shares are entitled to 909,090 votes. 
The high-vote shares, representing just 9.1% of the total number of shares, would secure voting 
majority control. Now, consider an ownership-percentage sunset provision set at 9%. This means that 
if the controller fails to own at least 90,000 shares, its high-vote shares will be converted to low-vote 
shares. Assume that the controller’s holdings of high-vote shares fall to 89,999 shares (representing 
899,990 votes) and the public’s holdings of low-vote shares rise to 910,001 shares (representing 910,001 
votes). At this point, the controller would have retained approximately 49.7% voting power and fallen 
short of majority control. However, with this ownership-percentage sunset provision, the controller’s 
shares would be converted to the same type of shares that the public enjoys, and her voting power 
would fall to just under 9%. In either case, with or without this ownership-percentage sunset 
provision, the controller would not have majority voting control. A low threshold is seen as ineffective 
since the controller already has a strong disincentive to go below 9.1%. Table 2 in the Appendix 
presents these numbers and percentages. 
204 See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (discussing issues where investors hold 
disproportionately more votes than their economic interest as well as situations where investors 
possess the ability to acquire votes when needed). 
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For example, Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. has a novel dual-class 
structure whereby Class A stock is entitled to one vote per share and Class B 
stock is entitled to ten votes per share with respect to all matters subject to a 
stockholder vote—with one notable exception.205 The one voting exception is 
remarkable: all common stock holders are entitled to vote on eight of ten 
board seats whereas only the low-vote Class A stockholders are entitled to 
vote on the remaining two board nominations.206 This fascinating structure 
accomplishes two things: it expressly guarantees low-vote stockholders to 
vote on 20 percent of the board of directors207 and effectively increases the 
ownership threshold for a controller to maintain majority control.208 When 
used in conjunction with low-voting stock, this mechanism is functionally 
similar to ownership-percentage sunset provisions, except that the “trigger” 
only relates to voting in the context of director elections and not voting in all 
general corporate matters.209 Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. appears to be 
unique in that only low-vote stock is entitled to a minimum fixed percentage 
of board seats with the potential for even greater representation.210 
In the case where the low-vote stock is generally nonvoting except for 
directorial elections, such a structure would only guarantee a fixed percentage of 
board seats, but have no bearing on the ownership threshold for a controller to 
maintain majority control.211 This same result is achieved if the corporation 
 
205 Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A) at 17 n.3 (Apr. 28, 2017). 
206 Id. at 1. 
207 Id. 
208 Recall that a controller of high-vote stock entitled to ten-to-one voting rights can hold 9.1% 
of the total number of shares to secure majority control. See supra notes 14 and 203 and accompanying 
text. Consider a new hypothetical firm with 1,000,000 shares of common stock, consisting of 230,770 
high-vote shares entitled to ten votes per share and 769,230 low-vote shares entitled to 1 vote per 
share. Additionally, assume that there are 10 board seats and the dual-class structure is modified such 
that all shareholders can vote on eight seats and only low-vote shareholders can vote on the remaining 
two seats—just like Beasley Broadcast Group. The 230,770 high-vote shares are entitled to 2,307,700 
votes whereas the 769,230 low-vote shares are entitled to 769,230 votes. The high-vote shares would 
represent approximately 23.1% of the firm’s cash flow rights and secure just over 75.0% of the firm’s 
voting rights over general corporate matters. Here, high-vote stockholders could guarantee six of ten 
board seats (i.e., 75% of eight board seats for which all shareholders can vote) and the low-vote 
stockholders would control the remaining four board seats (i.e., the two guaranteed board seats, plus 
25% of the eight board seats). This means that a controller would need to own 23.1% of outstanding 
shares—as compared to 9.1% of outstanding shares absent such a rule—to maintain board control. 
209 See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text. 
210 Although it is impossible to prove a negative, this descriptive statistic was based on an analysis 
of CII’s comprehensive dataset of Dual Class Companies. See Dual Class Companies List, supra note 100. 
211 Consider an extreme hypothetical firm with 1,000,000 shares of common stock, consisting 
of just one high-vote “golden share” entitled to one vote per share and 999,999 low-vote shares 
entitled to no votes per share. See Golden Share, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/g/goldenshare.asp [https://perma.cc/T35C-M9ZD] (defining a “golden share” as “[a] type of 
share that gives its shareholder veto power over changes to the company’s charter”). The one high-
vote share, mathematically representing just one-millionth of the total shares outstanding, would 
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chooses to affix the percentage of board seats for both the low-vote and high-vote 
classes’ stock. In fact, at least nine public companies have this sort of 
arrangement, including The Madison Square Garden Co., The New York Times 
Company, Nike, and Scholastic.212 These mechanisms are functionally similar to 
what we observe with cumulative voting arrangements.213 The justification for 
their use is also identical: enable minority shareholders to have directorial 
representation on the board despite the presence of a controller.214 Establishing 
a minimum fixed percentage of board seats to be determined by nonvoting shares 
and employing a voting arrangement like that of Beasley Broadcast can be 
tremendously useful for nonvoting shareholders to have board member influence. 
3. Require Nonvoting Shares to Have Certain Liquidity Rights 
Another potential solution is to mandate that nonvoting shares have at 
least some sort of liquidity preference vis-à-vis voting common stock to 
compensate shareholders for giving up their votes. Preferential shares are 
generally seen as a hybrid security with debt- and equity-like characteristics.215 
There can be a wide variety of rights and entitlements for preferred shares.216 
Preferred stockholders may be given a priority claim on cash flows in the 
event a company declares and pays a dividend or distributes assets to 
shareholders.217 In this way, preferred shares are entitled to preferential 
dividend rights and senior claims on assets in the event of a liquidation 
 
secure 100% voting control. Again, assume that there are ten board seats and the dual-class structure 
is modified such that all shareholders can vote on eight seats and only low-vote shareholders can 
vote on the remaining two seats. The controller’s one “golden share” could guarantee eight of ten 
board seats (i.e., 100% of eight board seats) and the low-vote stockholders would control the 
remaining two board seats (i.e., the two guaranteed board seats, plus 0% of the eight board seats). 
212 This descriptive statistic was also based on a computational analysis of CII’s compiled raw 
data. See Dual Class Companies List, supra note 100. 
213 Under cumulative voting, each shareholder may cast a total number of votes equal to the 
number of voting shares she owns multiplied by the total number of director seats open for election. 
There is just one vote en masse—rather than voting for each director one by one. Candidates who get 
the most votes win. The majority cannot outvote minority voters for every director. Cumulative Voting, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-cumulativevotehtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/PNP5-XQJU] (last updated Oct. 14, 2014). 
214 See id. (“Cumulative voting is a type of voting system that helps strengthen the ability of 
minority shareholders to elect a director.”). 
215 See Preferred Stock, FIDELITY INV., https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-
products/stocks/preferred-stock [https://perma.cc/R35C-JGWU] (noting that preferred stock “has 
investment performance characteristics that could combine some degree of exposure to both equity 
and debt of a particular issuer”). 
216 See id. (“The exact terms of preferred shareholders’ economic preference may vary from 
company to company.”). 
217 See id. (“Preferred shares . . . give their owners a priority claim whenever a company pays 
dividends or distributes assets to shareholders.”) 
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event.218 In the event that the company fails to pay a preferred dividend, “the 
preferred stockholders generally gain some voting rights, so that the common 
stockholders are obliged to share control of the company with the preferred 
holders.”219 Furthermore, “[d]irectors are also aware that failure to pay the 
preferred dividend earns the company a black mark with investors, so they do 
not take such a decision lightly.”220 
Alternatively, in the case of “convertible preferred stock,” the holder has 
the option to convert their preferential shares into common shares of the 
company.221 If the firm underperforms or runs into financial trouble, then 
preferred stockholders will preserve their security and retain their senior 
claim on the company’s assets in relation to the common stockholders. If the 
firm performs well, then preferred stockholders will choose to convert their 
investment into ordinary common stock and enjoy the upside in valuation. In 
other words, preferred stockholders will only exercise the conversion option 
embedded in their security if it is economical to do so.222 
Interestingly, many countries in continental Europe have implemented 
restrictions on dual-class structures.223 First, nonvoting publicly traded 
common stock is prohibited in a majority of all OECD countries.224 Instead, 
nonvoting preference shares are generally permitted in most OECD 
countries except for a few countries of northern Europe.225 Again, a holder of 
such financial instruments “obtains voting rights only in extreme 
circumstances such as neglect of the preferential rights or bankruptcy 
proceedings against the issuer.”226 For example, Germany allows nonvoting 
preferred shares with preferential dividend cash flow rights “to compensate 
for the absence of voting rights.”227 Many countries that prohibit nonvoting 
common shares and permit nonvoting preferential shares, however, still 
 
218 See JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 810 (3d ed. 2014) 
(“Preferred stock . . . usually has a preferential dividend and seniority in any liquidation . . . .”). 
219 RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 350 (10th ed. 2011). 
220 Id. 
221 See BERK & DEMARZO, supra note 218, at 810 (“[T]his preferred stock usually gives the owner an 
option to convert it into common stock on some future date, so it is often called convertible preferred stock”). 
222 Id. 
223 See generally OECD STEERING GRP. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, LACK OF PROPORTIONALITY 
BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/40038351.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4XY-P9KU] 
(analyzing restrictions on multiple share classes and voting entitlements across member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)). 
224 See id. at 15 (“[T]he 17 countries that do not allow such shares are mostly the ones that 
prohibit either multiple-class/differentiated voting right shares or non-voting preference shares.”). 
225 See id. (finding that only three OECD member countries prohibit nonvoting preference 
shares—Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden). 
226 Id. 
227 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 600 n.50. 
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impose restrictions on the percentage of equity capital that may be 
represented by preferential shares.228 
In some sense, apart from having a liquidity preference, nonvoting 
preferred shares are not functionally dissimilar from triggering-event sunset 
provisions, except that the “trigger” relates to the financial health of the firm’s 
operations rather than the physical and mental health of the firm’s 
controller.229 Mandating that low-voting public common stock receive some 
form of liquidity preference is too severe, as it would completely halt the use 
of dual-class structures which must be considered in the broader context of 
private companies choosing to remain private for longer.230 
4. Prohibit Dual-Class Companies from Participating in Stock Market Indices 
One solution implemented by stock market index providers has been to 
exclude new issuers of dual-class stock from participating in their market 
indices. The FTSE Russell indices proposed in 2017 that “companies that have 
5% or less of their voting rights in the hands of unrestricted shareholders . . . 
have their securities rendered ineligible for index inclusion.”231 This measure 
appeared to be aimed directly at Snap Inc. given that its public shareholders 
had no voting power.232 Similarly, the S&P Dow Jones Indices announced in 
2017 that the S&P Composite 1500® and component indices, including the 
widely recognized S&P 500 index, will no longer include dual-class companies 
on a prospective basis.233 
Clearly, these exclusions are intended to have a deterring effect. As one 
news commentator put it, “[j]oining the Standard & Poor’s 500—an index of 
 
228 See id. at 621 n.103 (“The size of the cap varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is 33% 
of the company equity capital in Belgium and Estonia; 40% in Greece; and 50% in Germany, 
Luxembourg, and Spain.”). 
229 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
231 FTSE Russell Voting Rights Consultation–Next Steps, FTSE RUSSELL 3 (July 2017), 
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Next_Step
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7E3-ZDWU]. 
232 See Ross Kerber & Noel Randewich, FTSE Russell to Exclude Snap from Stock Indexes over 
Voting Rights, REUTERS (July 26, 2017 4:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-russell/ftse-
russell-to-exclude-snap-from-stock-indexes-over-voting-rights-idUSKBN1AB2TW  (indicating that 
the CEO of FTSE Russell believed that “voting rights are an important issue” and proclaimed that 
“[s]hareholders won’t be able to hold boards accountable if they don’t have voting rights”). 
233 Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on 
Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-
assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PRG-EPHC]. Existing multiple-class companies were “grandfathered in.” Id. Snap Inc., 
however, was excluded. See e.g., Anita Balakrishnan, Snap Is Falling Again as Wall Street Worries About the 
Company’s Corporate Structure, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/01/snapchat-
excluded-from-sp-500-what-does-it-mean.html [https://perma.cc/TQ4R-VL6T] (“The [exclusion] 
prevents Snap from being included in most major S&P indexes.”). 
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the nation’s biggest and most popular stocks—has long been an important 
mark of validation for businesses. It signals that a company has ascended to 
corporate America’s elite and boosts its share price by about 5%.”234 
However, consider a controlling shareholder–founder of a large private 
enterprise that is contemplating the implementation of a dual-class structure 
upon IPO, but is also absolutely insistent that her company is included in a 
major stock market index. She could consider a tripartite class structure like 
Alphabet or Blue Apron such that five percent of voting power is in the hands 
of the public and become eligible for the Russell 3000 index but not the S&P 
1500 index. Alternatively, she could abandon her plans of installing a dual-class 
structure but implement a poison pill and classified board instead. Such 
defensive measures would still provide incredibly strong antitakeover 
protection without jeopardizing stock market index participation.235 It is 
apparent then that these stock market index policy measures are too blunt a 
tool since they can be easily circumvented. Index provider policy measures are 
an inferior solution to issues posed by dual-class structures as compared to 
more systematic forms of regulation which could be imposed through state 
corporate law and federal securities regulation. 
It is evident then that current forms of regulation do not adequately 
address the problems posed by nonvoting stock. 
 
234 Paresh Dave & Ethan Varian, S&P 500 Will Exclude Snap Because Its Stock Gives New 
Shareholders No Power, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hollywood/la-fi-snap-sp-20170801-story.html. 
235 For an example of this kind of strategizing, see generally Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, 
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. 2011), in which the court recognized substantive coercion as a legally 
cognizable threat despite the fact that its stockholders were “sophisticated” and could make an informed 
decision concerning a tender offer; the court then allowed the use of a poison pill in combination with 
a staggered board as an acceptable defensive action for purposes of the two-part Unocal test. See also 
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21-22 (Del. Ch. May 2, 
2014) (recognizing the potential for negative control at low ownership levels as a legally cognizable 
threat to justify the adoption of a poison pill as a proportionate response under Unocal and finding that 
shareholder disenfranchisement claims under Blasius will fail when any impact on electoral rights is 
incidental to the board’s defensive action). However, David J. Berger of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & 
Rosati has argued that there is an essential difference between companies that adopt both a poison pill 
and staggered board and companies that employ dual-class structures. Namely, the former type of 
company can still succumb to short-termism in an effort to keep activist investors at bay during two 
years of proxy fights. The latter type of company is free to pursue long-term objectives at the expense 
of short-term financial performance without risk of shareholder retribution. See Lowell Milken 
Institute for Business Law and Policy, Corporate Governance and Founder Control Panel, YOUTUBE (Mar. 
9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tu9LT2qQHZ4 [https://perma.cc/6FQR-U6VP] (“To be 
clear, the appeal in a staggered board isn’t even close to what dual-class stock provides.”). 
536 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 497 
B. Unimplemented Novel Approaches to Regulating Nonvoting Shares 
Given recent decisions where Delaware has recognized the theory of 
efficient capital markets in the appraisal rights context and principle of 
shareholder ratification in the fiduciary duty context, it is especially 
important that shareholder voting rights be fortified—and enlarged in the 
case of nonvoting shares altogether.236 I advance a new multipronged 
framework for regulating dual-class structures and nonvoting stock. Broadly 
speaking, effective regulations ought to enlarge voting powers or enlarge 
fiduciary protections in certain contexts. In order from least invasive to most 
forceful, federal securities laws could enable nonvoting shares to cast 
nonbinding votes; state corporate laws ought to legally mandate that 
nonvoting shareholders have a right to attend annual meetings in an observer 
capacity; state courts should impose a heightened standard of judicial review 
for companies with dual-class structures to encourage the use of procedures 
that empower shareholder votes; and nonvoting shares ought to have 
additional voting rights in some specific contexts as a matter of positive law. 
1. Enable Nonvoting Shares to Cast Nonbinding Votes 
One means of regulating nonvoting shares is to allow for nonbinding 
votes—recorded and disclosed just like any other votes. This device is similar 
to the “say-on-pay” and “say-on-frequency” provisions of Dodd–Frank, which 
are nonbinding.237 This would entitle nonvoting shareholders to cast a protest 
vote and enable them to broadcast strong signals of dissent to controllers and 
the marketplace in general.238 A nonbinding vote of nonvoting shareholders 
may help to discipline controlling shareholders and directors, to reduce 
agency costs and monitoring costs of directors by shareholders, and to assure 
that the board remains responsive to shareholder interests.239 
2. Enable Observer Rights and Information Access 
Another form of regulation would be to legally permit nonvoting 
shareholder participation in annual meetings in terms of observer rights and 
 
236 See supra notes 71 and 78 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra notes 192 and accompanying text. 
238 See Ronald Orol, Activist Investors Target Snapchat Parent Snap over Non-Voting IPO Shares, 
THESTREET (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13993165/1/insurgents-rail-
against-snap-over-non-voting-ipo-shares.html [https://perma.cc/V7HY-D8L2] (“Activist hedge 
funds can . . . target dual-class companies with unequal voting structures by nominating director 
candidates in the hopes that a large vote of the noninsider shareholders will back their nominees, 
sending an embarrassing message to the company that change is needed. However, companies with 
nonvoting shares will be impervious . . . .”(emphasis added)). 
239 See supra notes 28, 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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minimum information rights. Shareholders ought to be able to evaluate a 
company and its management team. 
One rationale for allowing dual-class structures is that “nonvoting shares 
can be used to allocate voting power to informed investors who value their 
voting rights.”240 If one is to accept this argument, nonvoting shareholders 
ought to have the ability to inform themselves, so they can choose among 
voting shares, nonvoting shares, or no shares at all. Appropriate disclosure 
underpins the duty of candor,241 securities fraud regulation,242 and recent 
Delaware doctrinal developments revealed in MFW and Corwin.243 
3. Impose a More Stringent Standard of Review for Dual-Class Companies 
to Encourage “One Share, One Vote” Voting in Specific Contexts 
Practitioners and academics have recently suggested that state courts 
could modify their judicial standards of review for dual-class companies.244 
As previously explored in Part I, fiduciary duties and voting power are two 
primary mechanisms by which common stockholders are protected by state 
corporate law, and there is a strong interplay between judicial standards of 
review for fiduciary duty allegations and degree of shareholder protection. 
Specifically, Professor Albert H. Choi argues that courts ought to apply a 
heightened standard and determine whether it is more likely than not that a 
controlling shareholder made decisions for private benefits rather than for the 
benefit of the corporation as a whole.245 When applying such a heightened 
scrutiny standard, Professor Choi asserts that “at least two factors should come 
into play. First is whether the separation of control from cash flow rights is 
 
240 Lund, supra note 136, at 5. 
241 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
242 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person 
. . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security.”). 
243 See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
244 See e.g., Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 53, 74 (2018) (“[L]egal mechanisms, such as dual class, stock pyramids, and cross 
ownership, should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny . . . .”); Haas & Brewer, supra note 
22, at 4 (“[One] interesting question is whether conditioning an interested transaction on, among 
other things, the approval of a majority of the outstanding nonvoting shares would cause a court to 
invoke the business judgment rule.”); Moloney, Sullivan & Sachar, supra note 22, at 13 (“In the end, 
however, Snap may have substituted one nuisance for another: frequent and protracted litigation 
under potentially heightened judicial scrutiny.”). 
245 See Choi, supra note 244, at 79 (“To the extent that decisions made or dictated by a 
controlling shareholder have a higher probability of being for personal benefit rather than for the 
corporation as a whole and that there is a strict separation between control rights and cash-flow 
rights under dual class structure, one possibility is for the courts to apply a heightened standard . . . 
in reviewing the transactions.”). 
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extreme . . . . Second, an emphasis should be put on the long-term return for 
the minority shareholders and for the firm as a whole.”246 While theoretically 
thorough, implementing this type of heighted scrutiny is likely to be 
problematic for a Delaware court. What does it mean for the wedge between 
voting rights and cash flow rights to be “extreme”?247 This sort of standard 
unsoundly introduces line-drawing problems, and a court of equity is unlikely 
to adopt hard and fast rules to do justice. How will a court determine “whether 
the firm has in fact produced value in the long run”?248 This invites a battle of 
experts to make arguments around what the appropriate industry benchmarks 
are and what the correct performance metrics are.249 Further, is “value” purely 
financial in nature or is there scope to consider nonfinancial interests250 as well 
as the impact on other constituents?251 Delaware courts are more equipped to 
grapple with issues of process and procedure rather than disputes over 
substance when creating new common law.252 A heightened standard of review 
is nonetheless warranted in the dual-class company context. 
Practitioner James Moloney of Gibson Dunn has focused on different 
aspects of heightened judicial scrutiny and argued that 
[w]hile the presence of non-voting shares does not itself preclude a review 
under the business judgment standard, it seems one practical effect of Snap’s 
voting structure is that it may deprive the Company of the basic mechanisms 
and tools to implement procedural safeguards, such as subjecting a proposed 
 
246 Id. at 79-80. 
247 Id. at 79. 
248 Id. at 80. 
249 Cf. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 68 (2012) 
(“‘Heterogeneous expectations’ asset-pricing models (which differ from conventional financial-
pricing models by assuming, realistically, that people disagree about the future) also suggest a 
number of ‘financial engineering’ tricks that short-term investors can push corporate managers to 
adopt to raise share price without improving long-term performance.”). 
250 See generally Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare 
Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 249, 270 (2017) (arguing that “shareholder welfare is not 
equivalent to market value” and concluding that “[o]ne way to facilitate [welfare maximization] is 
to let shareholders vote on the broad outlines of corporate policy”). Applying the Hart & Zingales 
framework to companies with dual-class structures presents a dilemma: if welfare maximization is 
achieved by allowing shareholders to vote on corporate policies, then companies that deviate from 
“one share, one vote” cannot achieve welfare maximization. 
251 Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (allowing 
directors in a hostile takeover battle to consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders 
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”), with Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hile concern for various 
corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the 
requirement that there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders.”). 
252 This assertion is consistent with the business judgement rule presumption, the burden shifting 
mechanism of Kahn v. Lynch, and the standard of review shifting mechanism of both MFW and Corwin. 
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transaction to a vote of the minority public shareholders (e.g., ‘majority-of-
the-minority’ approval). Such mechanisms would help shield some future 
business decisions from heightened judicial scrutiny.253 
On the contrary, however, I argue that nonvoting shareholders could 
introduce procedural safeguards in an attempt to comply with MFW and 
secure business judgement review in the context of controlling shareholder 
transactions. As a strict matter, MFW—not Corwin—ought to apply to 
corporations with dual-class structures.254 A blockholder with high-vote stock 
that has majority voting rights and a less-than-majority cash flow rights will 
always satisfy the definition of “controlling shareholder.”255 Recall, MFW 
shifts the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment when 
a merger is conditioned upon the “approval of [both] an independent, 
adequately-empowered Special Committee . . . and the uncoerced, informed 
vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”256 Thus, dual-class 
companies must replicate both of these protective measures. 
First, starting with the “majority-of-the-minority” provision, I argue that 
the relevant shareholder vote would be based on a majority of all shares across 
all classes of common stock, including nonvoting shares, adjusted for 
economic rights and unweighted for voting power. In this manner, “one share, 
one vote” would be implemented in specific conflicted or defective 
transaction contexts faced by a dual-class company. As long as the controller 
would not have control under a “one share, one vote” methodology, the 
controller could participate in the vote on equal terms such that cash flow 
 
253 Moloney, Sullivan & Sachar, supra note 22, at 12. 
254 In determining whether Corwin or MFW applies, the threshold question is whether the 
transaction involves a controlling shareholder. See generally, Steven M. Haas & Meghan Garrant, The 
Importance of Alleging Control: Between Corwin and MFW, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/19/the-importance-of-alleging-
control-between-corwin-and-mfw/#more-106215 [https://perma.cc/J77G-LLGW] (“If [a party is] 
deemed a controlling stockholder, then it would trigger heightened judicial scrutiny and require 
certain additional deal procedures to qualify for business judgment rule protection.”). 
255 A “controlling stockholder” is one who either controls a majority of a corporation’s voting 
power or wields “a combination of potent voting power and management control such that the 
stockholder could be deemed to have effective control of the board without actually owning a 
majority of stock.” Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015). For a minority 
blockholder, the inquiry is highly fact intensive, and one must not conflate mere influence with 
control. The percentage ownership for a less-than-majority shareholder is not dispositive. Compare 
In re Rouse Properties, Inc., C.A. No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018) 
(finding a 33.5% blockholder to not be a controller) with In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder 
Litig., C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding a 22.1% 
shareholder to be a controller). A court will also consider whether a minority blockholder could 
exercise veto rights and secure negative control when bylaws provide for supermajority voting 
requirements. Id. at *15. 
256 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
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rights would align with voting entitlements for the purposes of such a vote.257 
If the controller would still retain control under a “one share, one vote” 
methodology, the rule would revert to a majority-of-minority or majority-of-
unaffiliated regime. Furthermore, the voters would have to be uncoerced and 
informed so there would be need for adequate disclosure. In the case of 
nonvoting stock, such disclosure would have to be consistent with proxy 
statement admissions rather than minimal Form 8-K filings, even if it went 
beyond the information to which stockholders would otherwise be entitled.258 
Second, moving on to the “adequately empowered Special Committee,” I 
argue that director independence could be achieved if the low-vote or 
nonvoting shareholders were empowered to elect a certain proportion of 
directors.259 This would encourage dual-class companies to empower such 
shareholders to have directorial representation on the board, and these 
directors would form the basis for the Special Committee. 
I believe these two implementations could successfully reproduce the 
protective devices evinced by MFW. Although the business judgment rule 
review may seem to harm shareholders, it would benefit them on the whole 
since they would become empowered to make their own decisions in all sorts 
of conflicted transactions. This judicially imposed form of regulation would 
encourage—but not necessarily require—shareholder voting empowerment. 
4. Expressly Mandate “One Share, One Vote” Voting in Specific Contexts 
Next, I argue that “nonvoting shares” ought to have additional voting 
rights in some specific contexts mandated by positive law rather than 
stipulated by a corporation’s articles of incorporation. Specifically, “nonvoting 
shares” ought to have additional voting rights in fundamental transactions 
where the fear is heightened that a controller lacks appropriate incentives 
given the wedge between his voting rights and his cash flow rights. Under 
Delaware corporate law, nonvoting shareholders are not entitled to vote in the 
event of dissolution, mergers, consolidations, or substantial sales of assets.260 
Using a contractarian argument, shareholders of dual-class companies agreed 
to low-vote or nonvoting stock on the premise that the controlling founders 
have the unique skills to manage the enterprise and that the multiclass 
structure protects shareholders when there is a risk of influence from outside 
investors.261 However, upon a proposed sale of control to a third-party acquirer 
 
257 This is contrary to majority-of-minority or majority-of-unaffiliated voting schemes. 
258 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 205–214 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
261 When Google settled its shareholder litigation concerning its stock recapitalization plan, 
Chancellor Strine, in approving the settlement, adopted a contractarian view and said, “[T]he 
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these presumptions are no longer valid. Once a company is for sale, this should 
not only trigger Revlon duties for directors but should also trigger voting rights 
for nonvoting shareholders. In other words, “the object no longer is to protect 
or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”262 
CONCLUSION 
The voting rights of common stockholders have been gerrymandered 
through the use of dual-class stock structures which reshuffle voting 
entitlements and drive a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights. 
The extreme case of nonvoting common stock amounts to disenfranchisement 
of public shareholders and necessitates modest reform. Current forms of 
regulation inadequately address the problems posed by nonvoting stock. I 
have advanced a novel multipronged framework for regulating nonvoting 
stock. First, federal securities laws could enable nonvoting shares to cast 
nonbinding votes. Second, state corporate laws would legally mandate that 
nonvoting shareholders have the right to attend annual meetings in an 
observer role. Third, state courts could impose a heightened standard of 
judicial review compliant with MFW for companies with dual-class structures 
to encourage the use of procedures that empower shareholder votes. Fourth, 
nonvoting shares would have additional voting rights in some specific 
contexts as a matter of positive law. 
As SEC Chairman Jay Clayton recently conceded in public remarks, 
The engine of economic growth in this country depends significantly on the 
willingness of Main Street investors to put their hard-earned capital at risk in 
our markets over the long term. If our system of corporate governance is not 
ensuring that the views and fundamental interests of these long-term retail 
investors are being protected, then we have a lot of work to do to make it so.263 
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I expect nonvoting shares to be a renewed area of focus for founders and 
boards of directors,264 plaintiff’s attorneys and state law jurists,265 U.S. 
Congress and federal securities regulators,266 and stock exchanges and 
marketmakers in the decades to come. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: High-Vote, Low-Stock with 10-to-1 Voting Ratio 
 
Share Class 
Number of 
Shares 
Percent of 
Cash Flow 
Rights 
Number of 
Votes per 
Share 
Total 
Number of 
Votes 
Percent of 
Voting 
Rights 
Class B:  
High-Vote Stock 
90,910 9.0910% 10 909,100 50.0003% 
Class A:  
Low-Vote Stock 
909,090 90.9090% 1 909,090 49.9997% 
Total 1,000,000 100.0%  1,818,190 100.0% 
 
Table 2: High-Vote, Low-Stock with 10-to-1 Voting Ratio  
and an Ownership-Percentage Sunset Threshold at 9% 
 
Share Class 
Number of 
Shares 
Percent of 
Cash Flow 
Rights 
Number of 
Votes per 
Share 
Total 
Number of 
Votes 
Percent of 
Voting 
Rights 
Without Trigger      
Class B:  
High-Vote Stock 
89,999 8.9999% 10 899,990 49.7235% 
Class A:  
Low-Vote Stock 
910,001 91.0001% 1 910,001 50.2765% 
Total 1,000,000 100.0%  1,809,991 100.0% 
With Trigger      
Class B:  
High-Vote Stock 
89,999 8.9999% 1 89,999 8.9999% 
Class A:  
Low-Vote Stock 
910,001 91.0001% 1 910,001 91.0001% 
Total 1,000,000 100.0%  1,000,000 100.0% 
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